Procurement Efficiencies: Monitoring and Evaluation of Devanha Phase 2 - Research Findings by Morgan, J. et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procurement Efficiencies: Monitoring and Evaluation of Devanha
Phase 2 - Research Findings
Citation for published version:
Morgan, J, Carter, K, Evans, A & Bowles, A 2012, Procurement Efficiencies: Monitoring and Evaluation of
Devanha Phase 2 - Research Findings. Scottish Government.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Crown copyright 2012 You may re-use this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or
medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The
National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or e-mail: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Ho
us
in
g,
 R
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
Pl
an
ni
ng
Procurement Efficiencies: Monitoring and 
Evaluation of Devanha Phase 2
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCUREMENT EFFICIENCIES: MONITORING AND 
EVALUATION OF DEVANHA PHASE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James Morgan, Graeme Bowles and Kate Carter (Heriot-Watt 
University; Anna Evans (AE Consultants Ltd) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scottish Government Social Research 
2012 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this report are those of the researcher and 
do not necessarily represent those of the Scottish Government or 
Scottish Ministers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Crown copyright 2012 
You may re-use this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or 
medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, 
visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or write to the 
Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or e-mail: 
psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk 
 
This report is available on the Scottish Government Social Research 
website (www.scotland.gov.uk/socialresearch) only.   
iii 
 
  
 
Table of Contents 
 
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 
2 INTRODUCTION 4 
3 METHODOLOGY 7 
4 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 9 
5 GOVERNANCE 11 
6 COSTS AND GRANT 18 
7 PROCESS, COLLABORATION AND VALUE FOR MONEY 35 
8 PROCUREMENT CONSULTANTS 39 
9 QUALITY AND STANDARDS 44 
10 FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 49 
11 TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT 51 
12 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 55 
13 EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 61 
 
iv 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
Framework 
The framework is the strategic long term agreement between Devanha and the 
framework contractors to deliver the housing programme.  The framework allocated 
workload over the life of the programme to each of the contractors and set out broad 
terms relating to price and quality. The long term nature of any framework is 
intended to enable modern collaborative working principles to be embraced as a 
means to improving quality and procurement efficiency. 
 
Framework contractors 
The three framework contractors on Devanha were Chap, Bancon and Robertsons. 
 
NEC approach 
The NEC form of contract was adopted for Devanha. This is regarded as a best 
practice, collaborative procurement contract to promote the principles of value for 
money. NEC is widely used in framework arrangements, notably by the NHS in 
procuring healthcare projects. The specific form of NEC adopted in Devanha was 
NEC3 Option C - Target cost contract. 
 
Open book costing 
Open book costing is a central feature of the NEC form of procurement adopted in 
Devanha that allows the client to see the contractor‟s input costs. It involves the 
contractor “opening their books” on their supplier and material costs to the client. The 
construction cost to the contractor is used to set the target cost for each scheme. 
The open book process is a significantly different way of working for Devanha 
partners which required a higher level of trust and collaboration than required for 
traditional procurement. 
 
Compensation events 
Compensation events are a feature of NEC that replace variations and extension of 
time clauses found in traditional contracts. A Compensation Event compensates the 
contractor for any additional cost or time incurred on the construction of a scheme 
that is not the fault of the contractor, i.e. it is a client risk. Example compensation 
events would include revisions to the design or specification as the works progress, 
including substructure works and rework from special needs adaptations not 
considered in the original design. 
 
MVPI – Moray Volume Procurement Initiative 
Non-framework schemes procured in tranche 8 of Devanha. These schemes were 
procured by traditional arrangement outside of the framework and provide for some 
comparison between framework and non-framework schemes. 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Background 
 
1.1 This research project is a monitoring and evaluation study of the Devanha 
Phase 2 procurement initiative established in 2006 by five RSLs in North East 
Scotland: Aberdeenshire Housing Partnership, Castlehill Housing Association, 
Grampian Housing Association and Langstane Housing Association. Devanha 
sought to develop 1563 homes (later reduced to 1,383) while demonstrating 
quality improvements and efficiency savings. 
1.2 Devanha Phase 2 was a groundbreaking approach in Scotland, putting in 
place new structures and new methods of working.  
1.3 The Devanha programme consisted of 51 projects with a mix of rental and 
shared equity units including projects which were delivered through a 
framework agreement with three contractors: Bancon, Chap, and Robertsons 
and through section 75 agreements with a variety of other developers. The 
programme took place in three local authority areas: Aberdeen City, 
Aberdeenshire and Moray. 
The Research 
1.4 The research involved a four year monitoring exercise during which data was 
collected annually. In addition to monitoring Devanha‟s performance, the 
research aimed to analyse transferable lessons which could be learned from 
Devanha‟s experience. 
Key Findings 
1.5 The Devanha programme failed to meet the works cost target as set out in the 
Offer of Grant. On this measure value for money has not been achieved. 
However, the basis of the original target is not clear and therefore it cannot be 
concluded how realistic it actually is.   
1.6 Although incentivisation mechanisms for performance improvement were 
included in the procurement process, these did not relate to the Offer of Grant 
works cost targets. As such, the most important target was not used to drive 
performance improvement and procurement efficiency. This served to 
undermine the importance and awareness of the Offer of Grant target. 
1.7 The Devanha programme met its HAG target as set out in the Offer of Grant. 
This is due to numerous and complex rent setting and HAG administration 
factors and is not attributable to the Devanha procurement process 
1.8 The long term nature of the Devanha framework had the advantage of 
bringing price stability and predictability at a time of rising market conditions 
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when the agreement was signed. However as market conditions transformed 
at the later stages, traditional tendering was seen to provide more competitive 
pricing and better value for money. These conditions could not have been 
reasonably foreseen at the time of signing the agreement. 
1.9 There was no experience of the NEC form of contract used by Devanha within 
the project team at the outset. This contributed to many of the operational and 
implementation difficulties throughout most of the duration of the programme 
and served to undermine progress toward achieving value for money. The use 
of a procurement consultant was largely ineffective in mentoring Devanha on 
NEC. 
1.10 Devanha introduced a new procurement approach not previously experienced 
in the region. Innovative practices including greater collaboration, 
communication, open book costing and sharing of constructability experience 
were introduced into the procurement process. Devanha has developed 
procurement skills and experience that were previously absent in the region. 
1.11 Devanha lacked leadership; partly because it did not appoint a managing 
director and partly because of tensions between the Devanha Board and the 
individual RSLs. Devanha members recognised that these problems would 
have to be addressed in any future collaboration. 
1.12 Monitoring information was inadequate and the Board and the Programme 
Director therefore had to work very hard to put together data to manage the 
programme effectively. 
1.13 Although RSLs considered risk issues prior to involvement in Devanha, it has 
become clear that not all potential risks relating to financial liabilities were fully 
considered. 
1.14 Devanha suffered from a weak external profile and was a confusing 
organisation for local authorities to work with. Local authorities often felt that 
they were dealing with individual RSLs rather than Devanha. 
1.15 Devanha achieved success in building to a high quality but did not achieve 
significant savings through bulk procurement. 
1.16 Devanha was able to make a contribution to employment and training despite 
challenging economic circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
1.17 Devanha did not meet its works cost targets as set out in the Offer of Grant. It 
had greater success as a vehicle for building to a high quality, although 
success was limited by the lack of full implementation of a standard 
specification. The considerable change in the economic climate adversely 
affected Devanha‟s ability to achieve its targets and highlighted the 
importance of independent inflation monitoring in future programmes. 
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1.18 Through trialling an innovative approach Devanha shed light on a variety of 
key lessons for the efficient delivery of an affordable housing programme. 
Perhaps the most important of these relate to the key role of leadership and 
governance structure for a collaborative organisation. The readiness of project 
teams to implement novel forms of contract needs to be considered if the 
benefits of these approaches are to be realised. Effective and timely data 
collection and monitoring systems for management and incentivisation were 
shown to be important. Devanha also highlighted the need for fuller 
implementation of a standard specification at an early stage to improve quality 
and take advantage of any bulk procurement opportunities. 
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2 INTRODUCTION  
 
2.1 Devanha Phase 2 is a procurement initiative established by five RSLs in 
Grampian. Aberdeenshire Housing Partnership, Castlehill Housing 
Association, Grampian Housing Association, Langstane Housing Association 
and Tenants First Housing Co-operative formally came together in 2006 
through signing a Formation and Members Agreement (Devanha, 2006). The 
member associations agreed to work together through Devanha but retain 
their individual identities while Devanha acts as their agent to deliver: 
 1563 new homes for rent and LCHO and associated environmental 
improvements from 2007/08 to 2010/11, 
 quality improvements, 
 efficiency savings. 
 
2.2 The total number of units completed was revised to 1,383 primarily because 
inflation calculations carried out by procurement consultants the Collaborative 
Working Centre (CWC) and accepted by Scottish Government showed 
inflation to be above that allowed for in the Offer of Grant. 
2.3 The Devanha programme consisted of rental and shared equity units 
including projects which were delivered through a framework agreement with 
three contractors: Bancon, Chap, and Robertsons and a through section 75 
agreements with a variety of other developers.  
2.4 All but one of the section 75 developments were Design & Build schemes, the 
other scheme consisting of completed units which were bought from the 
contractor. Non-framework, Moray Volume Procurement Initiative (MVPI) 
developments accounted for most of the Devanha activity in Moray, with 
Grampian Housing Association as lead developer working with Springfield 
Properties. While Devanha could influence the section 75 developers to some 
extent, it had considerably more control over the framework contractors. 
Nevertheless, a significant majority of s75 developments included substantial 
elements of RSL/Devanha specification. 
2.5 Devanha Phase 2 built upon earlier experience of Devanha Phase 1, a 
procurement initiative developed under Communities Scotland‟s „Building a 
Better Deal‟ (BABD) agenda, which was a response to the Egan and Latham 
reports. Through greater customer focus, improving procurement, shortening 
the supply chain and using people and resources efficiently, Communities 
Scotland encouraged RSLs to become “best practice clients” with what the 
Egan Report (1998) described as a change of style, culture and process, 
rather than just a series of mechanistic activities. This collaborative approach 
underpinned the objectives for Devanha Phase 2. 
2.6 Heriot-Watt University and Anna Evans Housing Consultancy were 
commissioned by the Scottish Government1 to carry out a monitoring and 
                                            
1 The research was initially commissioned by Communities Scotland which was abolished in April 
2008.  
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evaluation study of Devanha Phase 2. The researchers established a 
monitoring system to track the progress of the Devanha initiative and three 
previous monitoring reports, Rounds 1, 2 and 3 were submitted to Scottish 
Government, highlighting progress, performance and governance issues.  
2.7 Devanha Phase 2 was introduced in the context of the development of a 
National Procurement Strategy by Communities Scotland. As national policy 
developed, earlier monitoring rounds of the current evaluation fed into 
Scottish Government‟s Housing Investment Reform Project. This final report 
focuses on an overall evaluation of the Devanha initiative. In accordance with 
the research brief, this evaluation also draws out transferable lessons which 
may be learnt from the Devanha experience and shared across the housing 
sector. 
Devanha Objectives and Evaluation 
2.8 Communities Scotland‟s Offer of Grant set a large number of objectives for 
Devanha. However, the Communities Scotland research brief (2007) noted 
that the key objective of Devanha phase 2 was to secure improved 
„programme procurement cost efficiencies‟  through the adoption of a revised  
procurement regime, embracing a consortium led, integrated procurement 
approach, the bulk of which was to be delivered through the use of 
Framework Agreements and „open book cost management‟. This evaluation 
analyses actual performance in relation to specific Offer of Grant targets on 
cost and grant. The analysis considers the processes which have been 
introduced to attempt to achieve these efficiencies. 
2.9 The Devanha Offer of Grant contained specific cost and grant efficiency 
targets which can be summarised as: 
 An average works cost saving of 7.3% over the duration of the 4 year 
programme. 
 
 A target grant cost benchmark for a four person home at April 2006 of 
£73,000, which would equate to a 10% real grant cost saving over the four 
year period.  
 
2.10 In addition to these headline objectives, the Offer of Grant includes objectives 
relating to: 
 Housing & Quality Standards 
 Devanha Train – a training and employment initiative 
 Framework Agreement 
 Gain Share / Pain Share Arrangements 
 
2.11 Communities Scotland‟s Offer of Grant put in place a process for accounting 
for inflation but the extent of the massive economic changes which occurred 
could not have been predicted. While our brief does not permit us to analyse 
value for money beyond the Offer of Grant targets and inflation adjustments, 
we do make comment on the system of inflation monitoring and on issues of 
wider value for money assessment. 
6 
 
2.12 Analysis of outcomes against cost efficiencies and housing quality along with 
less central objectives such as training is therefore central to the evaluation of 
the Devanha Phase 2 Initiative2. The evaluation also examines the delivery of 
the programme and, in particular, the impact which governance has had on 
management and delivery of Devanha‟s objectives. 
2.13 Devanha was a ground breaking approach in Scotland, putting in place new 
structures and new methods of working. Many of the principles upon which 
Devanha was built were based on the innovations set out in 
Recommendations for a National Procurement Strategy for Social Housing in 
Scotland (CWC, 2007). Communities Scotland therefore encouraged the 
engagement of CWC as consultants to mentor and assist Devanha. The 
current evaluation also looks at the impact of this working relationship on 
Devanha. 
2.14 Devanha operates over three local authority areas: Aberdeen City, 
Aberdeenshire and Moray. Local authorities‟ strategic and delivery roles have 
grown significantly over the period in which Devanha has operated, with the 
increasing importance of the Strategic Housing Investment Plan (SHIP). The 
relationship between Devanha and the three local authorities is therefore 
important to the success of the initiative. 
                                            
2 As discussed in the report, the inclusion of a large number of targets across cost, housing quality 
and wider objectives has had a bearing on the operation of Devanha. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 We aligned our research method to the established Devanha objectives and 
measures of success and have not imposed additional measures of success 
on Devanha. We have been guided by the Communities Scotland research 
brief and based our analysis around answering the questions raised by the 
brief. The other key document guiding our analysis has been the Offer of 
Grant from Scottish Ministers to Devanha Limited with the Consent of the 
Devanha Members (Communities Scotland, 2007) which sets out the 
objectives which Devanha had to meet.  
3.2 The research brief stated that the purpose of the research was to:  
 Establish and implement a monitoring and evaluation framework, 
 Evaluate and report on progress and impact, 
 Set out key findings and learning points to aid sharing best practice, 
 Provide evidence on transferable procurement practices, 
 Provide evidence of outcomes against Devanha objectives, 
 Provide evidence of whether those involved - Communities Scotland, RSL 
sectors, Consultants, Contractors and Supply Chain sectors - have 
appropriate policies, guidance and systems to manage change in 
procurement practice. 
(Communities Scotland, 2007) 
 
3.3 Table 3.1 shows the various methods employed and the questions which 
each addressed. A separate technical appendix gives more detail on the 
research tools used in the study. 
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Table 3.1 Research Methods and Tools 
Research Method/Tool Issues Addressed 
Develop Devanha Data Capture 
Proforma and deliver/analyse these in 
three rounds. 
Programme management, Housing 
quality & standards, KPIs, Training & 
Employment. 
Develop Scottish Government Data 
Capture Proforma and deliver/analyse 
this in four rounds. 
Cost and Grant. 
Develop Devanha Non Project Specific 
Data Capture Proforma and 
deliver/analyse this in three rounds. 
Programme level data on Training & 
Employment; Programme level data on 
quality innovation and modern methods 
of construction. 
Procurement Consultant Questionnaire 
Survey delivered in rounds 1 & 4. 
Procurement consultant issues. 
Governance Questionnaire Survey 
delivered in rounds 1 & 4. 
Devanha Board and RSL roles and 
relationships. Governance and sub-group 
structures, key issues for Devanha, 
Devanha‟s future. 
Board/Governance workshops in 4 
rounds. 
Wide ranging discussion involving Board 
and Programme Director. 
Individual Interviews with Devanha chair, 
individual board members and 
Programme Director. 
Strategic and programme issues. 
Process workshops in 3 rounds. Wide ranging discussion with Core group 
members and Development Director 
focusing on procurement, contract and 
other process issues. Also addressed 
issues of specification and quality. 
Analysis of procurement consultant 
reports including diagnostic reports, 
periodic open book process reviews, in 
rounds 1 and 2. 
Progress towards implementation of 
collaborative working and NEC contract. 
Analysis of Board and Subgroup minutes 
in 4 rounds. 
Wide ranging issues including 
governance, collaboration, quality, 
programme, cost monitoring. 
Analysis of Devanha specification Quality and standards. 
Analysis of Inflation Monitoring  Inflation monitoring and validation. 
Interviews with Core Group members 
including consultants, contractors and 
RSL development staff in round 4. 
To explore quality, process, collaboration 
and contract issues in confidential 
setting. 
Interviews with Devanha partners 
including Scottish Government and Local 
Authorities. 
Wide range of issues including systems, 
relationships, impact in different LA areas 
and the future of Devanha. 
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4 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT  
 
4.1 The Devanha Offer of Grant (Communities Scotland 2007) set out targets and 
details of funding for Devanha Phase 2. The overall programme was 
innovative in agreeing total spending over a four year period. Table 4.1 shows 
the total four year grant award of £115,088,139 including an “inflation risk 
allowance”.  
Table 4.1 Total HAG Allowance 
Item Amount 
Previous Drawdown £22,744,000 
Project Grant Limit £75,354,450 
Grant Inflation Allowance Limit £16,989,689 
Maximum Grant £115,088,139 
Source: Devanha Offer of Grant (2007) 
 
4.2 Within this overall amount, Devanha had to set out annual expenditure 
programmes based Scottish Government Grant Planning Targets (GPTs). 
Annual expenditure targets were controversial in that Devanha wanted greater 
freedom to plan over the four years. However, they are useful in helping 
Devanha and Scottish Government monitor progress to ensure that spending 
for the programme as a whole is on target and to guide Devanha in planning 
individual site starts and spending profiles.  
Programme Management under a New System 
4.3 Figure 4.1 shows difficulties experienced in the first year of the programme 
with delays to site starts resulting in lower expenditure than had been 
anticipated. The picture looked worse in relation to the single year expenditure 
because many projects scheduled to start in autumn 2007slipped to the end 
of the financial year or into the next. In all, the underspend in 2007/08 was in 
the order of 56% (around £10m from a GPT of £17.738m). 
Figure 4.1: Project Starts in 2007/2008 
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Source: Taken from Devanha Monitoring & Evaluation Report Round 1 October 2008 (Based on Data 
Capture Forms Returned By Devanha May 2008) 
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4.4 The delay and consequent initial underspend was due to greater than 
anticipated time taken in agreeing “validated” costs for the projects. High 
inflation in the construction sector in the North East resulted in more detailed 
discussions between Scottish Government and Devanha over validation of 
individual project costs. This occurred at a time when all parties were 
developing new procedures and there were delays on all sides; Devanha 
were developing a consistent format in which to collate data, CWC was 
developing its validation process and Scottish Government was refining the 
authorisation process. 
4.5 New, more streamlined approval procedures resolved this difficulty in later 
tranches of project approvals. The new system, agreed by both Scottish 
Government and Devanha increased the focus on cost control, allowing for 
some variation in costs from targets for projects but enabling streamlining of 
tranche approvals where no project was more than 10% above target and the 
tranche as a whole met the target. 
4.6 By June 2009, Devanha had significantly turned around its performance in 
programme delivery. Forty five of a total of 51 projects were on site or 
complete, with the first 12 at practical completion or final completion stage. 
Devanha had addressed the major programme delivery problem but this led to 
a different problem with insufficient grant funds available for the large number 
of projects on site during 2008/09. Devanha could have spent more than its 
GPT and there was a requirement for it to front fund some development. 
4.7 Devanha had overcome its initial problems as a delivery vehicle and by 2010 
all projects were on site or complete. At the time of writing, only the final large 
project at Donside in Aberdeen has not reached at least practical completion. 
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5 GOVERNANCE 
 
Devanha’s governance structure 
5.1 Devanha is managed and controlled by a Board of 10 Directors; each member 
association may nominate two directors and over the course of the four years 
the convention has been that these are the Chief Executives from each RSL 
and one of their RSL board members. Throughout most of the four year 
period Devanha had one employee, the Programme Director, who reported to 
the Board and attended its meetings. Other frequent attendees to Board 
meetings included representatives of the procurement consultants, CWC. 
Apart from the Programme Director and latterly a part time Partnership 
Director, Devanha had a support structure drawing on a range of existing RSL 
staff, and Devanha‟s framework contractors and consultants. There were six 
sub-groups:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strategic Client Group – consisted of the Development Directors, Devanha 
Programme Director, one Finance Officer and one Chief Executive providing a 
link to the Board. Its overall role was to push forward on the operationalisation 
of collaborative working. 
 Core Group – comprising RSL and Devanha development staff and 
framework consultants and contractors.  
 Performance Improvement Group – This had a similar membership to 
Strategic Client Group. Its role was as a „think tank‟ to consider issues of 
housing quality and innovation.  
 Development Officers Group – consisting of RSL Development Directors, its 
purpose was to develop policies and support the Board. 
 
Devanha 
Board 
Core 
 Group 
Performance 
Improvement 
Group 
Strategic  
Client  
Group 
Development 
Officers 
Group 
Finance 
Officers 
Group 
Housing 
Officers 
Group 
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 Housing Officers Group – members were CEOs from all RSLs,  it rarely met 
but did discuss rent harmonisation in the early years of Devanha.  
 Finance Officers Group – included finance officers from all RSLs and a Board 
representative. It provided financial support to the Board. 
5.2 In the first year‟s evaluation, there was some criticism that the „concentration 
on structural change‟ and slow set-up of the Board‟s support structure. It was 
concluded that this may have held up implementation of collaborative working 
and served as a distraction to delivery during Devanha‟s first year. This was 
also the first pointer to the lack of dedicated, senior leadership, a theme which 
recurred throughout the four years of the programme (discussed further 
below). 
5.3 The Strategic Client Group actively pushed forward collaborative working in a 
number of areas e.g. the framework agreement, contracts and open book cost 
management where progress had previously been slow. Board members felt 
that the Strategic Client Group and the Core Group were key to Devanha – 
the Strategic Client Group as „client‟ and the Core Group with a partner 
operational focus providing a communication route for partners. However, 
CWC and the Programme Director considered that the Core Group could 
have been more proactive in achieving shared learning.  
5.4 The Performance Improvement Group, Development Officer Group, Housing 
Officers Group and Finance Officer Group were in effect forums for ongoing 
(but sometimes overlapping) discussions between the RSLs and referral to 
the Board. This led to duplication and made some decision making protracted 
and cumbersome. The need for these forums reflects one of the defining 
aspects of Devanha - the fact that all the RSLs wanted to stay heavily 
involved in the management and governance of Devanha from the start. The 
Board workshops over the four years suggest that this anxiety has waned 
over time as members have developed their knowledge and understanding of 
collaborative working, and trust with each other. As reflected in the 
evaluation‟s final Board workshop, February 2012:  
“I came onto the Board half way through. What struck me immediately was 
that meetings resembled more like senior management team meetings 
because many of the issues were managerial, different from the governing 
body of an RSL.” 
 
“It was very cumbersome and time consuming. (We had) interminable 
meetings and some of the negotiation was very difficult.”  
 
5.5 This desire for the RSLs‟ continuing hands-on control (as represented through 
Board members and the sub structure) was also reflected in the Board‟s 
decisions regarding leadership. The Programme Director had no role in 
leading and championing issues with external partners. The weakness in 
Devanha‟s executive leadership was discussed in Round 1 of the evaluation, 
and in late 2008 the Board acted by making the internal appointment of a part 
time Partnership Director. This enabled a more efficient validation process but 
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did not address the leadership issue. Others, including CWC and Scottish 
Government continued to reflect on the weakness in client leadership.   
5.6 Lack of unanimity in the Board meant that Devanha never satisfactorily 
resolved this issue although Board acknowledge this gap in Devanha‟s 
structure, agreeing that there should have been a managing director in place 
from day one. The critical role for this person would be to champion 
relationships internally (between the RSLs, and with the framework partners) 
but also with the local authorities. However, Board members also reflected 
that they had not been ready to make the crucial decision on appointment 
until it was too late, for the reasons of trust and learning curves described 
above: 
“We needed a managing director as we kept coming across areas where 
people didn‟t have delegated powers. They needed powers to make decisions 
but at the time we were not willing to let go. If we were starting from square 
one we would have an MD now.”  
(Board member, Board workshop, February 2012) 
 
5.7 In summary, Devanha created a bureaucratic structure based on the partners‟ 
desire in the early days for hands-on involvement in the company. It failed to 
make the critical appointment of a managing director at the right time.  
Devanha’s strategic role 
5.8 The Devanha model is based on the company acting as agent of the 
individual RSLs in delivery of the development programme. It must therefore 
have sufficient control over the development programme to manage it and to 
make important decisions at both a project and a strategic level. When 
projects are on-site, project management lies with the individual RSLs 
although communication with Devanha must be ongoing for monitoring 
purposes.  
5.9 In Devanha model there is an inter-linked relationship between the RSLs and 
Devanha in setting development strategy. In theory, development strategy is a 
matter for the RSLs, whilst programme management and strategic decisions 
about execution of the programme and its future rests with the Devanha 
Board. Board members have a variety of views over whether strategic 
decision making is the responsibility of the RSLs or the Devanha Board. Most 
agree that programme management is the reserve of the Devanha Board and 
only a minority consider that individual project management is the 
responsibility of individual RSLs.  
5.10 The range of responses in relation to strategic responsibility and programme 
management demonstrate the joint venture relationship between Devanha 
and the RSLs. On the one hand this type of relationship can bring partners 
together where there are areas of common interest and shared learning but 
splits may also occur where there are differences in opinion and interest. 
Board minutes and discussions with the Board members show that tensions 
have built up progressively over the last few years over financial risk and 
specifically reconciliation of HAG between projects. Despite the difficult issues 
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that it has had to consider, the Board has developed over the last four years 
to a stage where it has been able to address these challenges in an open and 
honest way. 
“We have had serious challenges over the last 18 months and the way we 
have tried to address those has felt more open. It does not always feel 
comfortable if we have made a particular statement, or taken a particular 
stance, but I have found that over the last year there has been much greater 
focus on finding a way forward.” 
(Board member, Board workshop, February 2012) 
5.11 The Devanha Board clearly has the necessary skills and expertise to consider 
and debate complex policy and business issues and to make strategic 
decisions. This was due to the composition of the Board which comprises the 
RSL CEOs and members from existing RSL boards and so all had 
professional and governance skills and experience. By necessity, the Board 
agenda and style was very managerial in the early years (in order to get the 
programme up and running), but over time this proved to be no substitute for 
having the necessary organisational infrastructure to make processes and 
decision making more efficient, i.e. one senior executive leader who could 
drive action and broker issues between the partners in between Board 
meetings.  
5.12 One key example of the weaknesses that the Board considered was the 
inadequacy of monitoring data. The Board was hampered in its decision-
making by the inadequacy of information on project costs, a problem which 
was never satisfactorily resolved during the life of Devanha‟s programme. 
Board members explained this issue as the lack of understanding and the 
„learning curve‟ on the part of consultants, project managers and contractors 
over collaborative working, but ultimately that this was caused by inadequate 
training. However, as argued by one of the Board members in 2012, in the 
absence of a Managing Director, it was for the Board to put in time and 
commitment to ensure that these new processes were embedded and being 
practiced. 
5.13 In summary, Devanha did not meet its full potential in relation to its strategic 
role. Its ability to make efficient and effective decisions was hampered by the 
weaknesses in its executive structure, specifically lack of a managing director.  
5.14 During 2010 and 2011 a working party of the Devanha Board spent a 
considerable amount of time considering the options for the future of 
Devanha. A number of options were considered: the status quo ante, 
reverting to individual RSLs developing; lead developer, with one of the five 
RSLs undertaking development and procurement work on behalf of other 
RSLs (and perhaps other parties) in an agent-client relationship; a super 
developer, where a new entity would undertake the full range of strategic and 
business development in addition to project development, management and 
procurement roles, with individual RSLs having only a housekeeping role; and 
Devanha 3, otherwise known as the „Preferred Intermediate Model‟ (PIM) 
which was recommended to the Devanha Board.  
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5.15 PIM would be similar to current Devanha in that it would provide participating 
RSLs with a jointly controlled agency for managing a joint development 
programme, joint projects and procurement; but it would have business 
development and strategy under the direction of a reconstituted Board. The 
corporate structure would comprise a Managing Director (MD) and majority of 
non-executive directors (not CEOs but those representing Boards or 
Committees of Management), intended to ensure separation of non-executive 
and executive governance powers. There would also be a CEO Advisory 
Group.  
5.16 The Working Party‟s recommendations were considered in March 2011, 
alongside a counter proposal from Grampian Housing Association, suggesting 
an alternative of Sirius Group (the proposed Group of Langstane and 
Grampian Housing Associations) acting as lead developer. The constituent 
members of Devanha were then asked to consider their positions, and in June 
2011 three RSLs confirmed their preference to go with Sirius (when and if 
constituted), whilst the remaining two stated they were undecided. This lack of 
consensus for the future of Devanha remains, as confirmed by the 
governance questionnaires (completed in late 2011) and the Board workshop 
in 2012.  
Monitoring performance and managing risk 
5.17 Devanha‟s role in monitoring performance involves: establishing suitable 
monitoring frameworks; ensuring the availability of information to enable 
proper decision-making; and having appropriate control over programme and 
project performance. Throughout Devanha‟s four years, the role of 
Programme Director has been to monitor and report to the Board on 
programme and project progress and performance. The role of CWC as 
Procurement Consultant has been to undertake a range of procurement 
support, training and performance management activities.  
5.18 Scottish Government and the Board understood from the early stages of the 
programme that CWC would supply a web-based data recording and data 
sharing scheme. The tool would produce actual cash expended against 
Scottish Government targets month by month and the tool could report 
scheme by scheme as well as at programme level. However, throughout the 
four year programme Devanha has been dissatisfied with the end product 
which was said not to be fit for purpose. The Programme Director had to 
continually make his own fixes and had concluded by 2009 that a simple 
spreadsheet template, circulated to all project managers would achieve the 
same task. Nevertheless, evidence between 2008 and 2012 shows that the 
Board demonstrated a good level of scrutiny, instructing corrective action 
where necessary. 
5.19 While the monitoring framework was an important tool to enable efficient 
reporting to the Board, a much more critical issue for the Board was the 
accuracy of the data being produced by the consultants and contractors. 
Through the course of Devanha‟s programme it became clear that it was 
difficult to obtain accurate and timeous information in relation to actual and 
predicted costs for projects. There is evidence from minutes that the Board 
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continuously pressed project managers and contractors to provide the correct 
information. However, as time went on it was clear that this was not only to do 
with delays in provision of information but more critically the project managers‟ 
and contractors‟ understanding of the open book costing methodology, and 
their inability to provide accurate information. The Board convened a working 
party in March 2010 to consider the issue and concluded that the problem 
was caused by inadequate training, although some suggested it was to do 
with training not being embedded.  
5.20 The greatest problem which the Board has had to tackle over the last 18 
months to 2 years has been related to the impact of inadequate cost 
information i.e. confusion over each of the RSLs‟ exposure to cost risk. This 
problem has become more evident over the latter years of the programme as 
the actual costs have gradually been appearing from the contactors as 
projects completed. By March 2012 Scottish Government estimated that the 
overall grant shortfall including that for shared equity was around £1.78 
million. There are a number of ongoing discussions which will have a bearing 
on whether and to what extent there is a grant shortfall including relating to 
the final tenure balance and funding of Stage II costs for some schemes. 
5.21 The Board and the Finance Officers Group have considered at length through 
difficult debates a method through which any shortfall in grant should be 
reconciled and redistributed over the member organisations.  RSL members 
had not anticipated this situation occurring; most felt the formula for any grant 
redistribution was clear in the Formation Agreement (albeit regarding grant 
surpluses rather than shortfall), based around the principle of equitable 
distribution. Considerations included redistribution based on the principle that 
final grant distribution and thus responsibility for any shortfall, would be 
shared out on the basis of the respective number of bedspaces in the 
programme; concern that levels in performance have varied widely, ranging 
from savings of 22.7% to cost overruns of 47.3% with the consequence that 
some RSLs would be expected to repay grant money from savings while 
others had substantial increases in costs and grant entitlement; and the 
impact that different rent setting may have of grant calculations. 
Consequently, the board has not (at the time of writing) resolved this issue 
and has employed an external consultant to give advice.  
5.22 In considering this issue a Scottish Government representative stated:  
“The sharing of risk is an important issue for Devanha to deal with. It needs to 
be clear how (or whether) individual RSL finance can contribute to Devanha, 
e.g. to tackle common issues or to cross subsidise schemes. This may also 
be an area of interest for the Scottish Housing Regulator. Individual RSLs 
may also have to consider whether the risk of being involved in a collaborative 
venture outweighs the benefits for them as an organisation.” 
(Scottish Government, March 2012) 
 
5.23 Lessons can be learned from Devanha‟s experience in clarifying potential 
risks at the outset. More effective action from the Board may have ensured 
greater buy-in from the project managers and contractors in provision of 
suitable cost data at an earlier stage, which would have helped project the 
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cost risk sooner. Furthermore, the early consideration of the rent 
harmonization considered by Housing Officers Group in April 2008 seems to 
have been left unresolved by the Board, and this is an area which may prove 
crucial in reconciling the shortfall in grant across the RSLs. 
Relationships between Devanha and the RSLs 
 
5.24 Reviewing Devanha‟s experience over the four years, it may be concluded 
that the relationship has been characterised by the unwillingness of the RSLs 
to cede control to Devanha, particularly in the first half of the programme.  
One significant area of conflict has been the discussion over the HAG 
redistribution (as discussed above), and in terms of strategy development 
there was lack of a common voice and plan from Devanha.  
5.25 While there have continued to be tensions and difficult issues to resolve, the 
Board has learned to work more positively together for the collective benefit. 
Devanha moved from being “seen as a pest” by many of the RSLs to being 
seen as beneficial. But there is a sense that Devanha took too long to develop 
and realise these benefits, with the result being lack of effectiveness.  
5.26 The Board continued to argue that the shared learning and benefits of 
collaborative working were worthwhile, but acknowledged that there were 
inherent conflicts built into Devanha‟s structure and processes. The 
Governance Working Group recommended that Service Level Agreements 
between Devanha and the constituent RSLs were revisited so that RSLs 
would relinquish control of management of the programme.  
5.27 In 2012, Board members discussed how they managed the conflicts of 
interest and agreed that Devanha was “able to think for itself, was 
independent of the RSLs”, although there could not be 100% separation 
between the Devanha Board members, and their roles as CEO/Board 
members of the RSLs as they were the same people. But sharing the 
perspectives of the constituent members was also positive. Looking to the 
future, a number of the members stated that their RSL would not be happy if 
there was no representation on the Board (whether this was Devanha or an 
alternative procurement vehicle) given the importance of the issues 
considered.  
“We consider it vital to conserve the existing RSLs‟ individual identities, 
missions and commitments to particular client groups: because it is from 
these commitments that we get much of our energy, many fresh ideas and 
much of our excellent customer service.” 
(Report of the Governance Working Group, January 2011) 
 
5.28 Over the last four years RSL members struggled to cede control to Devanha 
to enable it to be fully effective. Over time the RSLs appreciated the key 
benefits of shared learning on collaborative working practices and the open 
book costing methodology. Looking forward, there is still a desire for the RSLs 
to maintain their independence in their development functions, and this will be 
a key criterion for any future Devanha or alternative procurement model. 
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6 COSTS AND GRANT 
 
Introduction 
 
6.1 This chapter considers whether the Devanha programme has achieved VFM 
with reference to the cost and grant data that has been collected from Scottish 
Government in the agreed format. Where reconciled completion data is 
available, actual HAG and works cost at scheme completion are compared 
with targets. For the remainder of schemes comparisons are made between 
Offer of Grant and validation stage targets. Additionally, data collected 
through workshops and interviews of a range of key participants in the 
Devanha programme has been used to inform the assessment of VFM.  
Final and Interim reports on Cost and Grant 
6.2 In previous years our reports on progress towards Devanha Offer of Grant 
works cost and HAG targets and evaluation of the Devanha procurement 
process have been partial due to lack of actual completion data. For this final 
report actual cost data is still incomplete, with data available for 757 units 
(56% of total to be constructed) in 35 schemes from the programme. 
Consequently, conclusions still have to be qualified though the quantitative 
and qualitative data that is available allows us to evaluate VFM 
Works Costs and Grant targets 
 
6.3 A number of Cost and Grant targets apply at different stages along the 
timeline of each scheme. This section reports on actual works cost and HAG 
expenditure performance against targets. However in assessing procurement 
efficiency and value for money of the design and construction process, works 
cost target is the more meaningful measure since there are a number of 
factors, e.g. to do with rent setting, that influence HAG expenditure but which 
are unrelated to procurement process. 
6.4 Target measures relating to works cost for each scheme are set out as 
follows: 
Devanha target The works cost target contained in the Devanha Offer of 
Grant. This was the target cost benchmark which, if met, 
would have demonstrated Value for Money. The 
benchmark related to a particular type of scheme with 
weightings used to adjust it as appropriate.  
 
Validated target An estimate of cost specific to each scheme based on the 
latest design and market information at the point of grant 
approval, and before the works commence. 
 
Adjusted target The validated target is subject to revision and adjustment 
to reflect design changes and client risks that occur 
during construction period. These adjustments relate to 
compensation events and are a central feature of NEC 
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form of procurement. 
 
Actual cost The actual cost is the final agreed signed off cost which is 
only known once construction is completed.  
 
6.5 The Devanha Target: The research was commissioned to monitor and 
evaluate performance of Devanha against targets set out in the Offer of Grant. 
Part 6 of this states that Devanha agreed to make average works cost savings 
of 7.3% over the programme, based on assumed savings of 5% in year 1, 7% 
in years 2 and 10% in year 3. The original target grant cost benchmark was 
expressed in the Offer of Grant as a “target grant cost benchmark for a 4 
person home at April 2006 of £68,648.” However the actual target that was 
applied to all schemes in Devanha related to a benchmark figure of £67,284 
which represented target works cost for a 3 person unit at April 2006. This is 
the accepted basis for target recorded in grant validation forms. This 
benchmark is used to calculate a target for each scheme in Devanha by 
applying the Scottish Government bedspaces weighting factor and Scottish 
Government agreed inflation uplift.  
6.6 The Scottish Government Validated target is that which is approved by 
Scottish Government at tender stage and is based on the Offer of Grant target 
adjusted to take account of scheme specific design and risk variables. The 
validation is an approval that the target cost for each scheme had been 
prepared in line with the agreed process on the advice of CWC. The Offer of 
Grant and Scottish Government validated targets are recorded on the 
Scheme Cost and Grant validation forms which provided data for this section.  
6.7 The Adjusted target works cost is known only at scheme completion stage. 
As each scheme is constructed, the target is reviewed and adjusted for 
agreed compensation events and their associated costs. Typically these 
relate to site risks and design changes initiated by the client and changing 
market conditions which affect contractors‟ costs. The final adjusted target is 
not known until the scheme is complete and all events have been costed. The 
adjusted target is crucial as it dictates the amount of gain or pain that is 
shared by the contractor according to the agreed mechanism. 
6.8 The actual cost is that which is signed off at scheme completion stage 
against which the Offer of Grant and Validation stage targets are compared. 
As the data shows, the divergence between actual cost and validated targets 
at scheme level can be very considerable due to the varying levels of price 
and design risk experienced. Validated targets became out of date quickly at 
a time when the market was changing rapidly and difficult site conditions and 
uncertain technical requirements not apparent at validation stage were 
reasons for validated target and actual cost variance. Whilst  RSLs shared in 
the benefits of a keener market, they bore much of the design risk through the 
NEC procurement approach.   
Assessing Value for Money  
 
6.9 The monitoring component of the research brief involves tracking and 
comparing numerical cost and grant data made available over the life of the 
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programme with the original targets set out in the Offer of Grant. As such, the 
ability of Devanha to meet these targets is transparent, objective and readily 
determined by a straightforward comparison of target and signed off cost and 
grant at completion stage of the schemes. It has become apparent however 
that the evaluation of whether VFM has been achieved is more than a 
straightforward comparison to determine whether Offer of Grant targets have 
been met. Many factors including market conditions, individual scheme and 
site characteristics and the project team‟s ability to influence events all affect 
actual cost. The target set in the original Offer of Grant and its achievability 
has also been an issue and is discussed later in this report. 
6.10 Probably the single most significant influence on Devanha performance has 
been the complete transformation of economic circumstances since the Offer 
of Grant was signed. These were obviously outwith the control of Devanha, 
but there are issues about how the Devanha process accounts for changing 
markets and prices compared to traditional procurement discussed in this 
report. Specifically, the ability of the framework approach to take advantage of 
a market which became very competitive as Devanha progressed is arguable 
and there are differing views on this within the Core group. Although the open 
book costing process allowed cost savings to be passed to the RSLs, the full 
benefit of traditional competitive tendering in a very keen market were 
probably not realized since the benefits were shared by both client and 
contractor, rather than solely by the client. However, this would only take into 
account costs and the criteria for comprehensive VFM assessment would go 
beyond capital cost and grant comparisons, and would ideally take account of 
life cycle costs, end user satisfaction and measures of product quality. The 
primary benchmarks set out in the Offer of Grant against which achievement 
of target is measured are cost and grant.  
Inflation and Market conditions 
 
6.11 The original target was to deliver 1563 houses for a fixed amount of grant 
which assumed a level of works cost inflation increases over the programme 
as set out below. These works cost inflation increases shown in Table 6.1 
were from forecasts provided by CWC using BCIS All-in Tender price index. 
Although the detail behind these are not available a review of BCIS data 
shows that these were forecasts of year-on-year tender price increases. As 
such the forecast only showed a slowing down of the rate of price level 
increase toward the latter part of Devanha, but did not forecast the fall of 
tender price levels actually experienced. Subsequent BCIS forecasts were 
revised downward as the gloomier economic outlook was becoming clearer. 
Table 6.1 Offer of Grant Inflation forecast 
 
Year 06/07 = 3.44%  
Year 07/08 = 5.33% 
Year 08/09 = 8.39%  
Year 09/10 = 6.86%.  
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6.12 As events have shown, the sharply rising market before onset of recession 
and its impact on inflation, subcontractor and supplier prices experienced by 
Devanha were not forecast at all and very quickly rendered the Offer of Grant 
inflation assumptions out of date. A comparison of the Offer of Grant figures in 
Table 6.1 with the original inflation and agreed inflation figures (Table 6.2 and 
Figure 6.1) which were applied at scheme validation stage to set targets at the 
level of individual schemes illustrates this. From the outset in tranche 1 these 
inflation rates outstripped the Offer of Grant assumptions. 
Table 6.2 Original and Agreed Inflation recorded at SG Scheme Cost and Grant 
Validation stage (percentages are relative to the 2006 base year) 
 
Tranche Original 
Inflation 
Agreed 
Inflation 
1 8.95% 18.72% 
2 8.95% 23.20% 
3 8.95% 25.44% 
4 18.09% 29.20% 
5 18.09% 32.96% 
6 18.09% 32.96% 
7 18.09% 36.93% 
8 18.09% 37.98% 
9 18.09% 37.98% 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Original and Agreed Inflation recorded at scheme validation stage 
 
 
 
 
6.13 The market conditions and level of inflation actually experienced in the North 
East has been a major issue for Devanha and its ability to deliver the 
programme.  It has been a source of repeated discussion throughout and 
Tranche 
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features strongly in the Core Group workshops and end of process interviews 
carried out with Devanha participants. Clearly, since revised works cost 
targets are based on agreed inflation levels prevailing at scheme validation 
stage, the assessment of inflation is key to setting the target and the 
subsequent ability to meet it. Scottish Government commissioned a separate 
Inflation Monitoring peer review report from HWU in 2009 which contained a 
number of conclusions and recommendations relating to the process for 
assessing agreed inflation. One of the main weaknesses highlighted was that 
much of the data used to inform the inflation allowance was derived from 
within Devanha and could not therefore reflect open market conditions. 
6.14 An important factor to note is the timing of when the Devanha Offer of Grant 
was prepared and signed in relation to national and regional construction 
market conditions. At this time the market was extremely buoyant and one of 
the benefits of a long term framework agreement in a rising market is that it 
can bring predictability to pricing and the capacity to deliver the programme. 
However, as the market turned to recession the extent to which the RSLs 
could take advantage of very keen pricing in open market conditions was 
arguable. The open book costing process did allow material and subcontract 
cost savings to be passed on, but probably not to the extent of traditional 
competitive tendering at individual scheme level. 
Figure 6.2   Unit works costs comparison between different Local Authority 
areas 
 
 Figure 6.2 is based on data supplied by Scottish Government and shows the 
average works cost trend across 4 regions in Scotland. Market pressures on 
works costs are seen to be broadly similar in each region. Throughout the 
nineties works costs were relatively flat before increasing from 2000 as the 
economy grew, with a steep rate of increase from around 2006 before the 
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onset of recession around 2008. If the North East were to have followed these 
trends across the Devanha period, where costs started to level off in Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Tayside, then Devanha should have been able to deliver 
greater cost savings. However, all indications from Devanha were that the 
market remained stronger for longer and that the onset of recession was 
delayed and less severe than the national picture. The inflation reports 
prepared by CWC and used as the basis for agreeing inflation uplifts 
supported this argument and are the source of evidence for market conditions 
being distinctly different in the north east. Since the inflation uplifts were used 
in adjusting cost targets at validation stage of schemes it is clear they are 
instrumental in the measurement of procurement efficiency. One of the key 
findings of this report is that any future procurement arrangements which 
involve inflation monitoring in target setting should consider independent third 
party assessment of inflation to ensure greater objectivity in any assessment 
or audit of value for money. 
 
 
Approach to Final Report – Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
6.15 At the time of writing of the report, complete and signed off data is only 
available for 35 of the 51 schemes which accounts for 757 units. Data up to 
Scottish Government validation stage has been made available for all 51 
schemes which does allow for a level of analysis in all schemes to inform the 
findings and conclusions.  
 
Analysis of Works Cost Data 
6.16 Table 6.3 summarises the works cost data discussed in this section. 
All schemes to completion stage – 35 schemes. 
 
6.17 The actual total works cost as signed off by Scottish Government is 4.22% 
above the Offer of Grant target. For the 35 schemes for which data is 
available therefore the Devanha works cost target has not been achieved. 
These schemes include a mix of tenure (rented and NSSE3), framework and 
non framework and are drawn across all 9 tranches. Deviation from target on 
individual schemes varies considerably, though the extremes are explained by 
scheme and site specific features and are not directly attributable to extent of 
procurement efficiency. For example, the near 50% reduction on Devanha 
target at one extreme is explained by a substantial reduction in scope of the 
works between target setting and validation stage on the scheme (a one-off 
circumstance). Similarly, the overrun of almost 43% is not due to extremely 
poor management or lack of efficiency, but difficult site conditions not 
accounted for in the notional Devanha target. 
6.18 Thus, variations from Offer of Grant target cannot be directly attributed to any 
management or procurement efficiency from the Devanha process since the 
adjusted targets for individual schemes can vary considerable from calculated 
                                            
3 NSSE is a shared equity scheme. 
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Offer of Grant target. That is to say, the Offer of Grant target is a notional 
benchmark that doesn‟t take into account scheme specific factors and risks.   
Tenure – NSSE v Rental (works cost) 
 
6.19 25 of the 35 schemes are for Rental and the remaining 10 are NSSE. The 
actual total works cost as signed off by Scottish Government for Rental 
schemes is 4.36% above the Offer of Grant target. For this rental subset of 
schemes the Offer of Grant target has not been met. 
6.20 The actual total works cost as signed off by Scottish Government for NSSE 
schemes is 3.60% above the Offer of Grant target. For the NSSE subset of 
schemes the Offer of Grant target has not been met, though performance 
is slightly better than Rental schemes albeit the data sample is smaller. 
Framework v Non-framework (works cost) 
 
6.21 19 of the 35 schemes are framework and the remaining 16 are non-
framework. The actual total works cost as signed off by Scottish Government 
for framework schemes is 9.36% above the Offer of Grant target. For this 
subset of schemes the Offer of Grant target has not been met. 
6.22 For Non Framework schemes the Offer of Grant works cost target is 2.78% 
below the Offer of Grant target. For the Non Framework subset of schemes 
the Offer of Grant target has therefore been met and the performance is 
better than framework schemes. Many of these schemes will have benefitted 
from going to the marketplace at a more favourable part of the economic cycle 
and the MVPI schemes were subject to a separate negotiation. 
Analysis by tranche (works cost) 
 
6.23 The average works cost saving in the Devanha target is based on averaged 
assumed increasing savings through procurement efficiencies over the life of 
Devanha programme. The data however does not convincingly support this 
assumption. When broken down by tranche there is no real pattern of 
improving performance apparent as shown in Table 6.5 but  the number of 
schemes and units available for analysis within each tranche does vary, 
meaning that a true like for like comparison cannot be carried out. It is 
encouraging though that the scale of the cost overruns experienced in tranche 
2 and tranche are not repeated later in the programme, 
6.24 As the figures in the Summary Table 6.3 show, the actual costs exceed the 
Offer of Grant works cost target at aggregate level for the framework 
schemes, but are below the Scottish Government validated target. This 
suggests that either efficiencies were not delivered as expected or the Offer of 
Grant target may have been too challenging for most schemes, or a 
combination of both (analysis at scheme level show most framework schemes 
do not meet the Devanha target). Regarding the SG validated target, 
interviews revealed a sense that the NEC gain/pain share process provided 
an incentive for contractors to be cautious in maintaining validation stage 
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targets at a high level and that the Scottish Government validated figures may 
therefore have been artificially high. 
Analysis of HAG Data 
6.25 Table 6.4 summarises the HAG data discussed in this section. 
6.26 This section reports on actual HAG expenditure against target HAG 
expenditure. However for reasons outlined at the start of the chapter HAG 
performance is not a good measure of procurement efficiency. Of course, 
works cost are a large component of HAG, but other non-construction related 
factors influence HAG. 
All schemes to completion stage – 35 schemes. 
 
6.27 The total Devanha Offer of Grant HAG target for the 35 signed off schemes, 
comprising 757 units, decreases by -8.02% at Scottish Government validation 
stage. The actual HAG as signed off by Scottish Government is 9.22% below 
the Offer of Grant target. For the 35 schemes for which data is available 
therefore the Devanha HAG target has been achieved. These schemes 
include a mix of tenure (rented and NSSE), framework and non framework 
and are drawn across all 9 tranches. Variance from target on individual 
schemes is considerable, from almost 80% reduction through to increase of 
almost 47%.  It is to be expected that works cost variation will cause HAG 
variation in individual schemes, but there are other influencing factors 
contributing to variation relating to calculation of grant in NSSE schemes and 
rent setting issues. 
Tenure – NSSE v Rental (HAG) 
 
6.28 Twenty five of the 35 schemes are for Rental and the remaining 10 are NSSE. 
The Offer of Grant HAG target for the rental schemes decreases by -2.53% at 
validation stage. The actual total HAG as signed off by Scottish Government 
for Rental schemes is -8.98% below the Offer of Grant target. For this 
subset of schemes the Offer of Grant target has been met. 
6.29 For NSSE schemes the Offer of Grant HAG target decreases by -15.81% at 
validation stage. The actual total HAG as signed off by Scottish Government 
is -10.56% below the Offer of Grant target. For the NSSE subset of 
schemes the Offer of Grant target has been met, and performance is 
slightly better than Rental schemes in percentage terms although the data 
sample is smaller and, as mentioned above, may reflect grant calculation and 
rent setting considerations which are outside Devanha‟s control.  
All schemes – Framework v Non-framework (HAG) 
 
6.30 Nineteen of the 35 schemes are framework and the remaining 16 are non-
framework. The Offer of Grant HAG target for the framework schemes 
increases  by 0.5% at validation stage. The actual total HAG as signed off by 
Scottish Government is -0.33% below the Offer of Grant target. For the 
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framework subset of schemes the Offer of Grant HAG target has been 
met. 
6.31 For Non Framework schemes the Offer of Grant HAG target  decreases by  
-18.34% at validation stage. The actual total HAG as signed off by Scottish 
Government is -20% on the Offer of Grant target. For the Non Framework 
subset of schemes the Offer of Grant target has therefore been met and 
the performance is better than framework schemes. Many of these schemes 
will have benefited from going to the marketplace at a more favourable part of 
the economic cycle and the MVPI schemes were subject to a separate 
negotiation. 
Analysis by tranche (HAG) 
 
6.32 When broken down by tranche there is no pattern of improving HAG 
performance apparent as shown in Table 6.6. However the number of 
schemes and units for analysis within each tranche does vary considerably, 
particularly since there are a number of schemes in tranches 5 to 8 which 
have yet to be signed-off. The sample is smaller meaning that a true like for 
like comparison is not carried out.  
6.33 It is apparent from the data that there are large variations between HAG 
targets, both at Offer of Grant and validation stage, and actual Grant 
expenditure at scheme level. In particular the variation exhibited between 
actual grant and validation stage grant is greater than for the same works cost 
comparison. These large variations at scheme level result from a number of 
factors unrelated to procurement efficiency and the Devanha process. 
Features affecting grant are not the same as for cost, e.g. rent setting and 
timing of rent setting.  
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TABLE 6.3 
SUMMARY analysis comparing targets and actual Works Cost : COMPLETED & SIGNED-OFF SCHEMES 
  WORKS COST           
              
  All  NSSE  Rental     Framework  Non Framework 
                
 schemes  35  10  25     19  16  
 units 757  163  594     399  358  
 D target 65,855,039  12,594,006  53,261,033     37,935,712  27,919,327  
 validated 69,503,884  13,906,845  55,597,039     42,462,540  27,041,344  
 actual 68,630,979  13,047,954  55,583,025     41,486,734  27,144,245  
                
Validated on D target 5.54%  10.42%  4.39%     11.93%  -3.14%  
Actual on SG validated -1.26%  -6.18%  -0.03%     -2.30%  0.38%  
Actual on D target 4.22%  3.60%  4.36%     9.36%  -2.78%  
              
 
TABLE 6.4 
SUMMARY analysis comparing targets and actual HAG : COMPLETED & SIGNED-OFF SCHEMES 
  HAG            
              
  All  NSSE  Rental     Framework  Non Framework 
                
 schemes  35  10  25     19  16  
 units 757  163  594     399  358  
 D target 58,301,343  8,910,628  49,390,715     31,942,884  26,358,459  
 validated 53,625,949  7,501,695  46,124,254     32,101,963  21,523,986  
 actual 52,925,348  7,969,552  44,955,796     31,839,047  21,086,301  
                
Validated on D target -8.02%  -15.81%  -6.61%     0.50%  -18.34%  
Actual on SG validated -1.31%  6.24%  -2.53%     -0.82%  -2.03%  
Actual on D target -9.22%  -10.56%  -8.98%     -0.33%  -20.00%  
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TABLE 6.5 
ANALYSIS by TRANCHE, WORKS COST - : COMPLETED & SIGNED-OFF SCHEMES 
Works 
cost           
    Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 Tranche 4 Tranche 5 Tranche 6 Tranche 7 Tranche 8 Tranche 9 
Number of schemes 13 1 3 7 2 3 1 3 2 
Number of units 288 27 53 141 58 44 22 116 8 
Devanha target 21,270,977 2,434,930 4,434,682 13,699,880 5,869,727 4,488,710 2,341,074 10,513,492 801,567 
SG validated target 22,953,255 2,884,424 5,469,185 14,659,120 6,258,246 4,991,282 2,411,037 9,073,598 803,737 
Actual   23,158,590 2,987,029 5,858,323 14,725,281 5,184,321 4,499,980 2,225,745 9,115,602 876,108 
                      
Validated on D target 7.91% 18.46% 23.33% 7.00% 6.62% 11.20% 2.99% -13.70% 0.27% 
Actual on SG validated 0.89% 3.56% 7.12% 0.45% -17.16% -9.84% -7.69% 0.46% 9.00% 
Actual on D target 8.87% 22.67% 32.10% 7.48% -11.68% 0.25% -4.93% -13.30% 9.30% 
 
 
TABLE 6.6 
ANALYSIS by TRANCHE, HAG - : COMPLETED & SIGNED-OFF SCHEMES 
HAG           
    Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 Tranche 4 Tranche 5 Tranche 6 Tranche 7 Tranche 8 Tranche 9 
Number of schemes 13 1 3 7 2 3 1 3 2 
Number of units 288 27 53 141 58 44 22 116 8 
Devanha target 18,612,194 2,185,055 4,164,860 11,531,877 5,091,500 3,847,643 1,929,282 10,361,646 577,286 
SG validated target 16,366,177 2,618,313 4,863,618 11,191,675 4,543,908 3,948,912 1,348,563 8,179,540 565,243 
Actual   16,041,767 2,574,824 4,812,921 11,689,429 4,174,552 3,830,629 1,233,487 7,879,644 688,095 
                      
Validated on D target -12.07% 19.83% 16.78% -2.95% -10.76% 2.63% -30.10% -21.06% -2.09% 
Actual on SG validated -1.98% -1.66% -1.04% 4.45% -8.13% -3.00% -8.53% -3.67% 21.73% 
Actual on D target -13.81% 17.84% 15.56% 1.37% -18.01% -0.44% -36.06% -23.95% 19.19% 
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Works Cost and HAG analysis for ALL schemes to validation stage 
All schemes to Validation stage – 51 schemes. (Works cost, Table 6.7) 
 
6.34 The total Devanha Offer of Grant works cost target for the 51 signed off 
schemes, comprising 1383 units, amounts to £131,964,986 adjusted for 
agreed inflation. At Scottish Government validation stage this rises to 
138,785,681 - an increase of 5.17% on the Offer of Grant target. On this 
basis, unless savings are made and the signed off actual costs are reduced 
the Offer of Grant target will not be achieved. These schemes include a mix of 
tenure (rented and NSSE), framework and non framework and are drawn 
across all 9 tranches.  
Tenure- NSSE v Rental (works cost) 
 
6.35 35 of the 51 schemes are for Rental and the remaining 16 are NSSE. The 
Offer of Grant works cost target for the rental schemes equates to 
£104,854,314. At Scottish Government validation stage this rises 
£109,899,020- an increase of 4.81%. For this subset of schemes, and based 
only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the Offer 
of Grant target would not be met. 
6.36 For the 16 NSSE schemes the Offer of Grant works cost target equates to 
£27,110,672. At Scottish Government validation stage this rises to 
£28,886,661 - an increase of 6.55%. For the NSSE subset of schemes, and 
based only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the 
Offer of Grant target would not be met. 
Framework v Non-framework (works cost) 
 
6.37 32 of the 51 schemes are framework and the remaining 19 are non-
framework. The Offer of Grant works cost target for the framework schemes 
equates to £96,089,793. At Scottish Government validation stage this rises to 
£104,442,389 - an increase of 8.69%. For this subset of schemes, and based 
only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the Offer 
of Grant target would not be met. 
6.38 For Non Framework schemes the Offer of Grant works cost target equates to 
£35,875,193. At Scottish Government validation stage this reduces to 
£34,343,292- a decrease of 4.27%. For the Non Framework  subset of 
schemes, and based only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and 
validation stage, the Offer of Grant target would be met. Thus the 
performance is better than framework schemes.  
 
All schemes to Validation stage – 51 schemes. (HAG, Table 6.8) 
 
6.39 The total Devanha Offer of Grant HAG target for the 51 signed off schemes, 
comprising 1386 units, amounts to £120,864,158 adjusted for agreed inflation. 
At Scottish Government validation stage this reduces to £113,128,516 - a 
decrease of 6.40% on the Offer of Grant target. On this basis the Offer of 
Grant target will be achieved. These schemes include a mix of tenure (rented 
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and NSSE), framework and non framework and are drawn across all 9 
tranches. 
Tenure- NSSE v Rental (HAG) 
 
6.40 35 of the 51 schemes are for Rental and the remaining 16 are NSSE. The 
Offer of Grant HAG target for the rental schemes equates to £100,436,736. At 
Scottish Government validation stage this reduces to £95,662,554- a 
decrease of -4.75%. For this subset of schemes, and based only on a 
comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the Offer of Grant 
target would be met. 
6.41 For the 16 NSSE schemes the Offer of Grant works cost target equates to 
£20,427,422. At Scottish Government validation stage this reduces to 
£17,465,962- a decrease of -14.50%. For the NSSE subset of schemes, and 
based only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the 
Offer of Grant target would  be met. 
Framework v Non-framework (HAG) 
 
6.42 32 of the 51 schemes are framework and the remaining 19 are non-
framework. The Offer of Grant works cost target for the framework schemes 
equates to £86,966,044. At Scottish Government validation stage this reduces 
to £85,407,374- a decrease of -1.79%. For this subset of schemes, and based 
only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and validation stage, the Offer 
of Grant target would be met. 
 
6.43 For Non Framework schemes the Offer of Grant works cost target equates to 
£33,898,114. At Scottish Government validation stage this reduces to 
£27,721,142- a decrease of -18.22%. For the Non Framework  subset of 
schemes, and based only on a comparison between Offer of Grant and 
validation stage, the Offer of Grant target would be met.  
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TABLE 6.7 
SUMMARY analysis comparing Devanha target and Validated Works Cost : ALL Schemes  
  Works Cost        
           
  All  NSSE  Rental   Framework  
Non 
Framework 
             
 schemes  51  16  35   32  19 
 Units 1386  311  1075   990  396 
 D target 131,964,986  27,110,672  104,854,314   96,089,793  35,875,193 
 Validated 138,785,681  28,886,661  109,899,020   104,442,389  34,343,292 
                    
Validated on D 
target   5.17%  6.55%  4.81%   8.69%  -4.27% 
         
 
TABLE 6.8 
SUMMARY analysis comparing Devanha target and Validated HAG : ALL Schemes  
  HAG          
           
  All  NSSE  Rental   Framework  
Non 
Framework 
             
 schemes  51  16  35   32  19 
 units 1386  311  1075   990  396 
 D target 120,864,158  20,427,422  100,436,736   86,966,044  33,898,114 
 validated 113,128,516  17,465,962  95,662,554   85,407,374  27,721,142 
                      
Validated on D target -6.40%  -14.50%  -4.75%   -1.79%  -18.22% 
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Trend in performance – Validation stage 
 
6.44 Validation stage data is available for all 51 schemes of the programme. Table 
6.9 below shows that for those signed off schemes where actual costs have 
been reconciled, the Devanha works cost target overrun at validation stage 
was only slightly less than for those schemes which remain to be signed-off 
(i.e. where actual cost and grant data not available at the time of writing). This 
suggests that if actual data at sign-off stage were available for all schemes, 
the pattern would be similar to that for the 35 schemes where completion data 
is available i.e. the actual cost would be slightly below validation stage works 
cost target, but slightly above Offer of Grant target. It can reasonably be 
concluded that the data on which this report is based is representative of the 
Devanha programme as a whole, and that the basis for the conclusions and 
recommendations being presented are robust. Extrapolating trends for target 
and actual HAG across the whole programme are even more problematic due 
to the number of variables affecting HAG.  
 
 Table 6.9  Trend between Validated and signed-off 
   SG validated against Devanha target  
      Works Cost HAG    
All schemes  (51)  5.17% -6.40%    
         
Signed-off schemes 
(35)  4.22% -8.02%    
         
Schemes not signed-off (16) 4.80% -4.89%    
 
 
 
Evaluation of Value for Money – Works cost target 
 
6.45 Of the 35 completed and signed-off schemes only 12 have actually met the 
Devanha works costs target, of which 8 are non framework. Therefore only 4 
of the 35 framework schemes (11%) have actually met works cost target 
(Table 6.10).  However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that this 
in itself is evidence of exceptional performance or procurement efficiency for 
these four schemes.  Subsequent revisions to targets have been carried out 
and agreed between contractor and project manager to account for particular 
scheme and site characteristics and changing market conditions.  A clear 
example from the table below is Denmark St Fraserburgh NSSE, which shows 
a reduction on Offer of Grant target, but was actually one of the few schemes 
subject to pain share by the contractor since the actual cost exceeded the 
final adjusted target.  
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Table 6.10 - Framework schemes achieving Works Cost target 
Scheme Actual cost on 
Devanha target 
Actual cost on 
Validated 
target 
Adjusted target 
met (Yes/No) 
Deveron Rd, Huntly NSSE -30.03% -34.61% Yes 
Denmark St, Fraserburgh NSSE -14.04% -27.11% No 
Deveron Rd, Huntly R -7.11% -12.80% Yes 
Hillside, Portlethen (Drum) -4.93% -7.69% Yes 
 
Gain and Pain share on Scheme Completion costs 
 
6.46 Of the 35 completed and signed off schemes, 16 of the schemes show gain 
share and 5 show pain share as a result of being above or below adjusted 
target. The remaining 14 delivered to target. On this evidence, with only 14% 
of schemes (5 out of 35) in a „pain‟ situation (Table 6.11) at sign off then the 
majority of schemes have performed to adjusted target or better at final 
sign off stage. Comparing this to Devanha Offer of Grant target where 66% 
of schemes (23 out of 35) are in excess of this it is clear that the targets do 
not reconcile, which serves to confuse the overall VFM assessment. On the 
one hand there is the Devanha Offer of Grant works cost target for each 
scheme and on the other hand there is the adjusted target which is only 
known when the risks become apparent and all compensation events are 
accounted for. The Devanha Offer of Grant target is a notional benchmark 
and the adjusted target is a reflection of actual site and scheme specific 
conditions. If the Devanha Offer of Grant target is being overshot in most 
cases then arguably the target is unrealistically low and unachievable even 
with an efficient procurement process. Of course the counter to this is that 
targets were deliberately challenging and that Devanha programme should 
have delivered.   
6.47 The actual cost of 3 of the schemes  were clearly below both the Offer of 
Grant and Scottish Government validated targets, but the fact that a scheme 
incurring pain share is apparently below these targets (Denmark St, 
Fraserburgh NSSE) demonstrates that  procurement efficiency and good 
practice cannot be concluded from the Scottish Government target figures.  
 
 
Table 6.11 Schemes with Pain share (Framework and Non Framework) 
Tomintoul (NSSE) 
Denmark St, Fraserburgh NSSE 
Distillery Site, Oldmeldrum 
NSSE      
Distillery Site, Oldmeldrum Rent 
Tomintoul (Rent) 
Non-
Framework 
Framework 
Framework 
Framework 
Non-
Framework 
 
Conclusions 
6.48 Performance by disaggregated elements of the programme: rented/shared 
equity, framework/non-framework in relation to HAG and cost targets are set 
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out in the conclusions in Chapter 13. In summary, the only element of the 
programme to meet the Offer of Grant works cost target was the non-
framework schemes. The programme as a whole and all of the above 
mentioned sub-sets met the target Offer of Grant HAG target. However HAG 
performance is not a reliable indicator of construction or procurement 
efficiency due to the other factors which influence its final calculation. 
6.49 The expectation was that the Devanha process would provide for incremental 
improvement in works cost performance. However, the evidence for this was 
very weak when performance is analysed by tranche and it is concluded that 
continuous improvement in procurement efficiency was not demonstrated by 
Devanha over the duration of the programme. The number of schemes and 
units within each tranche does vary considerably though, meaning that a true 
like for like comparison cannot be carried out.  
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7 PROCESS, COLLABORATION AND VALUE FOR MONEY 
 
Devanha Works Cost Target Setting 
 
7.1 It is debatable whether the mechanism for calculating the Devanha Offer of 
Grant works costs target at scheme level was realistic, given the complexity 
and variability that existed across schemes. The Devanha target accounted 
for house type and was weighted accordingly for each scheme but did not 
account for the range of technical and design risks that existed and were 
subsequently accounted for in the adjusted target. These typically related to 
groundworks, utilities and infrastructure for which the contractor is 
compensated and the client carries the risk. This raises the more fundamental 
question of whether NEC form of contract where the client does bear much of 
the design risk is appropriate for social housing procurement programmes. A 
further significant design risk related to special needs adaptations which were 
not accounted for in the original design or cost targets, and again the client 
bore the cost and time risk resulting from redesign and rework on site. It is 
also open to question as whether the ambitious Devanha Offer of Grant works 
cost targets actually incentivized procurement efficiency and savings. 
Although there was a level of awareness of the Offer of Grant targets, the 
adjusted targets were considered the „real‟ targets that contractors worked 
toward. 
Devanha Process and Influence on Cost Savings and Procurement Efficiency 
 
7.2 In addition to the monitoring of cost and grant targets, the evaluation of 
Devanha involved qualitative data collection through the Core Group focus 
group workshops and confidential semi structured one-to-one interviews. Both 
were valuable in understanding experiences of the Devanha participants and 
gaining an insight into how the procurement process worked from the various 
developer RSL, consultant and contractor perspectives. In particular, the 
interviews at the end of the programme provided a reflection on overall value 
for money and the influence that the Devanha process had on costs and 
value.  
7.3 One of the aims of bulk procurement programme was to secure incremental 
improvements in efficiency gains/cost savings year on year from the Devanha 
framework approach. However this has not been borne out by the evidence in 
that there is no pattern of increased savings from tranche to tranche. A strong 
impression gained from the interviews across Devanha participants was that 
there was a large element of chance as to whether targets were met and 
performance was good or bad, and this resulted from the site and other 
technical characteristics. As such, the influence of the Devanha process on 
VFM and cost savings, at scheme level, is difficult to evaluate numerically. 
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VFM, Competition and the Devanha Process 
 
7.4 The competitiveness of the Devanha process is a key determinant of VFM. 
The difficulty of any framework agreement is that, in securing the benefits of a 
long term framework of closer collaboration and supply chain integration, the 
price advantages of traditional lowest cost competitive tendering are not fully 
realised. Although the open book costing process ensured open market prices 
from subcontractors and suppliers were reflected in adjusted target costs, the 
level of price competition was arguably not as high as would have been 
secured through traditional tendering.  
7.5 The approach in Devanha was to allocate all the workload to framework 
contractors from the outset. It may have been advisable to introduce a staged 
allocation of schemes which could have reviewed contractor performance mid 
way through the programme for the purpose of further allocation of work. This 
would provide an additional mechanism to ensure competition between 
framework contractors is maintained throughout a bulk procurement 
programme. 
Value for Money and the views of Devanha 
 
7.6 The ultimate question is whether Devanha bulk procurement offered VFM 
when compared to traditional procurement approach. Responses from across 
the range of participants varied from possibly to yes. No one was of the 
opinion that Devanha did not offer value for money compared to a traditional 
procurement approach with contractors more positive in response to this 
question. They readily pointed to the open book costing process which meant 
that RSLs did share in the benefits of keener material and supplier prices as 
the market cooled. Of course RSLs would also have benefited from market 
conditions through traditional open tendering procurement. RSLs were more 
equivocal/less convinced that they were able to benefit from increased price 
competition in the open market as the programme progressed. A key issue 
related to timing, in that economic and market conditions at the end of 
Devanha were completely different to those at the start and could not 
reasonably have been foreseen. As such what could bluntly be termed a 
„sellers‟ market became a „buyers‟ market - conditions where traditional 
competitive tendering in the open market provides the keenest prices. 
However, it should be borne in mind that VFM extends beyond keenest price 
and lowest capital cost.    
Implementation and Operation of the NEC Approach. 
 
7.7 The benefits and limitations of the Devanha bulk procurement process have 
been considered and reported on at each round of the research. The Core 
group asserted there was a higher level of collaboration than experienced 
through traditional procurement and this manifested in better communication, 
trust, open book costing and sharing of buildability experience.  The January 
2012 closeout interviews largely supported this, though there was a view 
expressed that not all framework contractors fully bought into the collaborative 
approach.    
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7.8 The lack of understanding and experience of the NEC procurement process 
that is fundamental to operational aspects of Devanha procurement were 
clear from early on in the process, despite the engagement of a procurement 
consultant from the outset. In Round 2 we reported on the difficulties related 
to the operational aspects of implementing the NEC Devanha approach. Poor 
preparation for the Devanha approach was also widely observed at the close 
out interviews. There was a strong and consistent view that the procurement 
consultant workshops and training failed to prepare the team adequately and 
the lack of time upfront for development work was widely considered a 
problem.  
7.9 The importance of extending training and awareness of the Devanha process 
and associated KPIs to site level personnel was not fully realised until late on 
in Devanha. Only when the influence site personnel had on meeting KPIs, and 
therefore influencing gain share became clear was this fully realised as 
schemes were completed and signed off. In particular, the defects KPI had 
great importance in this respect. Communication of Devanha targets 
throughout the organisation was slow. Throughout the duration of Devanha, 
the Offer of Grant targets themselves were not generally known at Core 
Group level. 
7.10 For the most part, partnering did not extend beyond the first tier contractors.  
This wasn‟t from a lack of willingness or conscious inaction. Rather, the small 
size and fragmented nature of subcontract activity meant that real benefits 
from this hadn‟t been identified. The lack of a true Devanha specification, 
uniformly applied over all projects from the start, meant that the opportunity 
for bulk buying and strategic involvement of subcontractors was severely 
limited.   
Open Book Costing 
 
7.11 Mid way through Devanha the impression was of contractors undergoing a 
cultural change in coming to terms with open book costing. By the end of 
Devanha, Chap and Bancon were fully engaged in open book costing and 
cited this as means of passing savings from keener price competition on to 
RSLs when the question of VFM was raised. The open book costing process 
is a contractual feature of NEC and the contractors have been compliant with 
this. As indicated in the report, Robertsons did not respond to any invitation to 
participate in interviews to explore their approach and experiences. It is the 
case that savings are passed on, but the contractor shares the savings 
whereas the client would secure all of these under full scheme by scheme 
competitive tendering. Evidence of this may be seen in non-
framework schemes where prices were very keen. There is undoubtedly more 
market testing under traditional lowest cost competitive tendering, though at 
the expense of collaboration and other gains in value and quality.  
 
  38 
Devanha Offer of Grant Works Cost Targets and Scottish Government 
Validated Targets. 
 
7.12 In the concluding interviews the consistent view was that the Offer of Grant 
targets were unrealistically low and unachievable. Originally, the targets had 
been proposed by Communities Scotland and accepted by Devanha RSLs as 
aspirational targets which were the basis for acceptance of the Offer of Grant. 
However, interviewees felt that there was no apparent justification for the 
target and there was no involvement of consultants or contractors in target 
setting. Through time, and with inflationary adjustments, this target was seen 
as increasingly divorced from the reality on the ground. Clearly, given the 
views expressed by interviewees, the justification for the target did not 
permeate effectively to the level of those running the schemes.  
7.13 A single target (with weightings to adjust for different house types) was overly 
simplistic and didn‟t take account of the many site and infrastructure factors 
that influence costs. Although there was some level of awareness of the 
Devanha targets by the contractors and consultants, the Scottish Government 
validated targets were considered as the „real‟ targets. At scheme level the 
ability to meet the target related to the extent of difficulties with the site or 
other technical issues, rather than application of any Devanha process 
initiatives. Also a frequently cited reason for rising costs was late design 
changes, in particular adaptations for special needs not considered at the 
design stage. The waste, inefficiency and extra cost to the RSL of such 
rework are obvious. Variations are an almost inevitable feature in the course 
of construction projects. The key question is who bears the risk for these and 
under the NEC approach the RSLs absorb much of the risk through 
compensation events.   
Compensation Events and the NEC Approach 
 
7.14 The Devanha process had little bearing on the type or extent of compensation 
events in schemes. There was a consistent view that these variations would 
have happened anyway as they were largely a consequence of technical and 
site specific issues such as ground conditions or changing requirements and 
design changes as schemes progressed. 
Gain / Pain Share and KPIs 
 
7.15 Pain has been limited and there was mostly gain as a result of favourable 
market conditions following the validation of targets. Schemes ostensibly 
performed well because they were delivered below target but this was as a 
result of Scottish Government validated target being set before the impact of 
much keener subcontractor prices was felt. Falling prices rather than 
contractor behaviours or Devanha process was the reason for the 
performance. It is therefore arguable the extent to which contractors earned 
the gain. Nevertheless, the Gain/Pain share mechanism allowed for this.  
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8 PROCUREMENT CONSULTANTS  
 
8.1 Devanha Phase 2 funding was dependent on the use of an independent 
procurement consultant to provide training, and embed collaborative working 
linked to the use of NEC contracts and partnering. The Evaluation 
investigated the impact of the use of a procurement consultant through two 
questionnaire surveys, interviews and workshops. The various strands of 
research highlight tensions and dissatisfaction but also some positive results 
of involvement of the procurement consultant. 
8.2 A questionnaire was sent out twice to the Devanha CEOs, other board 
members, staff, Development Directors and Project Managers to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a procurement consultant in the implementation of the 
Devanha programme. The first questionnaire was completed towards the 
beginning (summer 2008) and the second at the end of the programme 
(March 2012). There were 11 responses from a possible 17 to the 2008 
questionnaire and 10 from a possible 16 to the 2012 questionnaire. 
8.3 Table 8.1 shows the responses to questions which relate to issues which 
could be broadly defined as technical training. 
Table 8.1 Technical Training - Contract 
Devanha influencing 
understanding of NEC 
Contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 CWC influencing 
understanding of NEC 
Contracts 
2008 0 0 4 3 4 2008 
2012 0 2 3 3 2 2012 
 
8.4 In both years the majority of respondents saw the influence in understanding 
contracts as being primarily from the procurement consultants. This would be 
consistent with the consultants fulfilling their role. Interestingly, this was less 
pronounced in 2012 indicating that Devanha had increased in its confidence 
in relation to the contract. As shown in table 8.2, the procurement consultants 
were also seen as having led on understanding of open book cost 
management. This should, however, be seen in the context of relatively poor 
embedding of this technical training at the right levels, as discussed 
elsewhere in this report. 
Table 8.2 Technical Training – Open Book 
Devanha leading on 
understanding of Open 
book cost management 
1 2 3 4 5 CWC leading on 
understanding of Open 
book cost management 
2008 0 0 4 4 3 2008 
2012 0 1 1 5 3 2012 
 
8.5 Changing culture and work practices from the traditional to a more 
collaborative approach is an essential element of the modernised 
procurement agenda.  The second major area explored in the questionnaire 
was the consultant influence on development of a collaborative team. 
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Table 8.3 Developing the Collaborative Team - Communication 
Devanha influencing 
Improved Communication  
1 2 3 4 5 CWC influencing 
Improved Communication 
2008 1 4 4 5 1 2008 
2012 1 5 3 1 0 2012 
 
8.6 Views were fairly mixed on who had most influence on improved 
communication. This would seem appropriate and again the move towards 
Devanha having more influence later in the programme is consistent with 
Devanha taking ownership of the issue. However, this is not to say that 
communication was good. We have seen elsewhere in this report that 
communication with external stakeholders was a problem and that 
dissemination of Devanha practices throughout member and partner 
organisations did not always occur. 
8.7 Across both surveys, respondents tended to see customer focus, continuous 
improvement and creative problem solving as being more influenced by 
Devanha. Once again this would be positive and consistent with Devanha 
taking responsibility for implementation of the programme, focus on improving 
quality and overcoming difficulties as they arose. 
8.8 The questionnaire explored the question of leadership and empowerment. 
Table 8.4 shows that these issues were mostly seen as being influenced by 
Devanha. 
Table 8.4 Leadership and Empowerment 
Devanha influencing 
Leadership and 
Empowerment 
1 2 3 4 5 CWC influencing 
Leadership and 
Empowerment 
2008 0 5 5 1 0 2008 
2012 1 7 2 0 0 2012 
 
8.9 Leadership problems have limited Devanha‟s successes over the whole 
programme. The consultants recognised this and in interview suggest that 
they offered to take a more active role than their original brief required. The 
consultant proposed to take on more of a role in implementation of structure 
change below the Board level where the consultant would act as a „change 
manager‟ on an interim basis. This, they believed, could have provided interim 
leadership which Devanha could take over through time. The proposal was 
not accepted by Devanha. 
8.10 Nonetheless, the procurement consultant had a role in facilitating change 
within Devanha and the surveys explored satisfaction with how well the 
consultant had fulfilled this role. A majority of respondents to the 2012 
procurement questionnaire were dissatisfied with consultant performance in 
facilitating workshops, communication and changing working practices within 
Devanha. The procurement consultant criticised the level of competency 
achieved in collaborative working and believed that there had been little 
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change in the client or the supply chain, with an essentially traditional 
approach remaining. 
8.11 Devanha members and partners believed they were already better informed 
of the issues pertinent to Devanha programme and the Procurement 
Consultant did not offer any significant input beyond organising the events. 
Several consultants and contractors arranged their own in-house training on 
topics in what they saw as a more relevant manner. This related particularly to 
„Open-book costing‟. Some members were concerned that procurement 
consultant fees had been out of proportion to the service offered, and that 
value for money had not been achieved. 
8.12 The procurement consultants believed that Devanha benefited from their 
involvement but that „inertia‟ within Devanha was a limiting factor. They also 
noted that more could have been achieved at the workshops if the right 
people had attended; they had advised that there were too many senior 
managers and not enough people delivering the projects. This meant learning 
did not permeate down to the appropriate people in the organisations. 
8.13 Some positive changes were associated with the use of a Procurement 
Consultant although the perception of these positive changes generally 
diminished from the beginning of the programme to the end. „Knowledge 
Sharing‟ is consistently seen as a positive change arising from the 
consultant‟s input. Positive views on „Collaboration across RSLs‟; 
„Collaboration with Stakeholders and Supply Chain‟; and „Identification of 
Goals‟ were all evident but have all diminished in the view of respondents 
over the duration of Devanha. There were benefits from the use of the 
procurement consultant in relation to greater general awareness of 
collaborative practice and of the technical details of NEC contracts; new ways 
of working; introduction of open book; and provision of external cost 
validation. 
8.14 The procurement consultant‟s diagnostic analysis4 showed that there was 
improvement in Devanha performance in collaborative working but they 
believed that more could have been achieved if there had been more „drive‟ 
on the part of Devanha. Research workshops held with Core Group members 
in 2010 confirmed greater awareness and use of aspects of the NEC contract 
although there were still significant deficiencies (as reported in discussion of 
the process elsewhere in this report). In particular, there was enthusiasm for 
the benefits brought by adoption of the Gateway process in development of 
projects. 
Delivery 
 
8.15 A Likert Scale was used in the surveys to indicate the extent of involvement in 
delivery of the programme. A score of 1 meant that delivery was solely carried 
out by Devanha and 5 meant it was solely carried out by the consultant. Table 
                                            
4 A systematic rating against a four point scale based on interview. Potentially useful but caution has 
to be used in interpreting it, as it presents qualitative information in a quantitative format.   
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8.5 shows results from 2012 for three key areas of delivery where Devanha 
would be expected to lead but with support from the consultant. 
Table 8.5 Involvement in Delivery (2012 survey) 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Devanha leading on Open book 
cost management 
0 4 3 3 0 CWC leading on Open book cost 
management 
Devanha leading on Performance 
improvement and measurement 
1 3 4 2 0 CWC leading on Performance 
improvement and measurement 
Devanha leading on Scheme 
mobilisation 
4 3 3 0 0 CWC leading on Scheme 
mobilisation 
Devanha leading on Modern 
methods of construction 
5 3 2 0 0 CWC leading on Modern methods 
of construction 
 
8.16 The pattern of answers shown in table 8.5 supports the view that the 
procurement consults were acting in a supportive role while Devanha took the 
lead in delivery in all areas. Given the unfamiliarity of the open book process it 
is reasonable that the consultants were seen to have a greater role than in 
other areas. 
8.17 Performance improvement and measurement was an area where the 
consultant had a role. In practice there was a large difference between 
Devanha‟s expectations and what was achieved in the area of measurement. 
Through a number of workshops and interviews Devanha, its members and 
partners expressed dissatisfaction over the quality of data which was 
available for monitoring cost, scheme progress and performance. 
8.18 The consultant had offered to produce a web based data management 
system which would simplify scheme data collection and allow the board and 
project managers to monitor and manage schemes efficiently. However, 
although this system was set up, it was never used and was seen by Devanha 
as not fit for purpose. The research team were able to witness the Programme 
Director taking large amounts of data from a variety of sources to try to 
populate the web based tool without any practical output and then producing 
alternative spreadsheets which were, instead, used to inform the Board and 
assist it in programme monitoring and control. 
8.19 The consultant believed that the failings in this respect were not a function of 
the web based tool but occurred because Devanha did not use it as it was 
intended. A lot of data was held on the platform but Devanha did not devolve 
responsibility for maintaining it to the Project Managers as they should have. It 
was therefore too onerous for the Programme Director to maintain. A 
consultant representative stated that he tried to push Devanha to devolve this 
function but with no success. 
8.20 Availability of data to assist in performance management and incentivisation 
was also problematic. Devanha and its partners were unable to produce data 
which would inform understanding of performance against KPIs early enough 
in projects for this to incentivise contractor performance as had been 
intended. Devanha and its partners viewed this as having been a failing in the 
system devised by the procurement consultants.  The procurement 
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consultants also saw this as a problem but believed the KPIs were set up 
appropriately but were not used properly in project monitoring status reports. 
Rather, they were completed by Clerks of Works at the end and therefore no 
use in incentivisation. 
8.21 It is clear that the content and timing of data available for the Board to 
manage the programme was always a problem. KPI data was also available 
at the wrong time to incentivise improved performance. There are conflicting 
views over the causes of these problems and they were a source of tension 
and dissatisfaction between Devanha and its procurement consultants. That 
these difficulties were never resolved is another example of lack of strong 
leadership within Devanha. Devanha took responsibility for creative problem 
solving but a managing director would have had responsibility for resolving 
the problem and less than adequate fixes would not have been allowed to 
persist throughout the programme. 
Conclusion 
 
8.22 The use of a Procurement Consultant was considered by many Devanha 
members to be necessary for the introduction of different ways of working. 
This was particularly important for the financial and contractual framework 
established by the use of NEC and „Open-book costing‟. There was clearly 
some important assistance given in the use of NEC.  
8.23 Effort expended in creating a web based tool was wasted as this was 
unusable by Devanha. Neither Devanha nor its project managers believed 
that the system contained data in a form which was compatible with their 
needs; data which was collected had to be manipulated to fit the requirements 
of the tool. The commissioning of such a tool must include ensuring that it 
aligns with the data available to and required by the client and the systems in 
place within the user organisations. This did not occur in Devanha. 
8.24 Many participants in Devanha did not believe that the use of the Procurement 
Consultant was aligned to the needs of the Devanha members. Some 
consultees saw geographic separation as a cause of poor communication 
between the procurement consultants and Devanha.  
8.25 The procurement consultant believed that Devanha and its partners had not 
learned the necessary competences of collaborative working but put this 
down to leadership issues and Devanha not being committed to the 
necessary improvements. 
8.26 Given that there were a variety of areas of frustration which were not 
satisfactorily resolved, it could also reasonably be argued that a stronger, 
more focused leadership from Devanha could have addressed these issues in 
consultation with the procurement consultant and created more satisfactory 
outcomes.  
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9 QUALITY AND STANDARDS 
 
9.1 Annual data capture forms, workshops and interviews were used to collect 
data and explore the issues of housing and quality standards. The data forms 
from 45 projects were received and included information on SAP ratings, mix 
of housing type, brownfield or greenfield status, approaches to Modern 
Methods of Construction (MMC) and use of Renewables. The interviews and 
workshops allowed the stakeholders (client, consultants and contractors) to 
explore these issues, and a range of topics, including specification and bulk 
procurement in more detail.   
9.2 The Devanha Offer of Grant required the following: 
 Improvements in environmental performance, sustainability and reductions in 
environmental impact, and; 
 Improvements in quality, productivity and value for money through the use of 
continued improvement activity. 
 
9.3 The Core Group and the Performance Improvement Group including 
development directors/managers, project managers, contractors, and 
architects explored the issues of Housing Quality and the integration of 
Modern Methods of Construction (MMC) within the Devanha programme. 
They were effective in providing an opportunity for sharing learning across 
schemes and connecting separate organisations that were party to the 
Devanha agreement. The research team examined Specification documents 
and minutes from the Performance Improvement Group and the Core Group. 
Environmental Performance and Sustainability 
9.4 Devanha were committed to developing a range of housing units that had a 
low environmental impact in operational terms and made use of renewable 
material and renewable energy sources.  
9.5 The Devanha agreement stated that all scheme developments achieve a 
SAP2001 rating of no less than 100 or equivalent. During the programme 
some schemes were evaluated using SAP2005. These schemes required a 
rating of 80 to comply with the Devanha agreement. Two early Section 75 
schemes which pre-dated the Devanha agreement failed to meet this 
standard. These projects did not use the Devanha specification and were 
designed according to developers‟ specifications. Only four section 75 
schemes exceeded SAP targets, contrasting sharply with the schemes 
delivered through the Devanha framework where 28 schemes exceeded the 
SAP targets, the remaining four meeting the target. 
9.6 The introduction and use of renewable materials and alternative energy 
sources was embedded in the agreement for Devanha housing and quality 
standards. A wide range of approaches were adopted across the schemes to 
achieve this aim. While lots of positive steps were taken to address the 
sourcing of materials, products and components, the opportunity to maximise 
the potential of cross programme procurement was not achieved. This was 
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because the Devanha agreement was signed at a stage when a large 
proportion of detailed design work had been completed. 
9.7 Many schemes were constructed using timber frame, developed and 
fabricated by local contractors. As Devanha progressed, the contractors 
evolved their approach to building timber frames, with the introduction of 
cassette units and refined panel systems. This provided opportunities for good 
control of quality in the build. This is evident in a number of schemes 
achieving better levels of air tightness than anticipated. However, the 
approaches taken by the three framework contractors were different and so 
this benefit was not evident in all schemes. 
9.8 The focus on renewable materials and alternative energy appears to be on 
the improvement of the building fabric of the units to reduce energy 
consumption. A wide range of approaches is adopted across the forty five 
schemes. The following range of issues characterise the Devanha schemes: 
 Waste Management strategies employed by the contractors to reduce the 
amount of material waste on site.  
 Local sourcing of material, particularly concrete block, has been specified in a 
number of schemes. This reduces the transport cost and associated energy 
with moving materials large distances. 
 Timber frame construction utilising locally sourced timber has been adopted to 
provide units by one contractor. 
 Management of fill material between sites has optimised the re-use of site 
material. This was attributed to an individual contractor operating more than 
one site for the client. 
 Some of the schemes have been „super-insulated‟ which means that no 
central heating system is required, and in theory the occupants will not require 
to heat their homes at all.  
 Air source heat pumps are being installed on a few schemes which will 
provide a low cost heating system for the units.  (These were mostly 
framework schemes but they were also installed as part of the non-framework 
MVPI.) 
 A number of schemes have high efficiency boilers and low energy lighting. 
 One scheme has a central heating plant with underfloor heating, which will 
provide low-cost heating to tenants. 
 
9.9 The ambitious SAP rating levels across the majority of Devanha schemes is 
the dominant cross programme achievement in relation to environmental 
performance and sustainability. This target has been instrumental in 
improving the performance of the units and leads to reduced heating costs 
and associated fuel poverty. 
 
Devanha Standard Specification and Modern Methods of Construction  
9.10 Devanha Phase 2 was committed to the promotion of building in higher quality 
as standard and within the agreed “target costs”. The aim of improving quality 
while reducing costs was seen as a significant challenge by stakeholders in 
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Devanha. It is generally perceived by client, contractors, project manager and 
architect that the quality of housing has improved through the delivery 
programme. No data on tenant satisfaction was available from completed 
schemes to provide an occupant viewpoint although this again is perceived to 
be largely positive by Devanha on the basis of informal feedback from 
tenants.  
9.11 A Devanha specification was adopted early in the process, and this was used 
for all 45 schemes that were evaluated. The Devanha specification is based 
on the standard specification previously developed by Grampian Housing 
Association. This specification is based on working practices that have been 
used by the RSL and their consultants in previous projects. However, 
interpretation of the specification for individual Devanha schemes has resulted 
in a large number of variations across the programme. The causes of this are 
diverse, and include individual site constraints, planning considerations, RSL 
Development managers‟ preferences, Maintenance staff preferences, 
Contractor working methods, and supply chain issues. The ability to be 
flexible in applying the specification to schemes is clearly important for a 
programme of diverse projects, such as Devanha Phase 2. However, the 
inconsistent approach has made bulk procurement, standardised 
specifications and quality control more difficult to achieve. There is scope for 
greater standardisation and potential savings than was achieved in Devanha.  
9.12 The Core Group and the Performance Improvement Group considered 
specification issues at regular intervals throughout Devanha, with the aim of 
identifying processes, and components that could be adopted across the 
programme. These groups explored the use of alternative methods of 
construction and standardisation of component specification. This included 
the following: Windows; Doors; Ironmongery; Sanitary Ware; Kitchen Units; 
and Boilers. This has resulted in cross programme efficiencies in procuring 
key repetitive components. There was also clear development of standard 
house types, one of the key successes of the framework, which were used 
through most of the later framework schemes. A few schemes unable to adopt 
standard house types were influenced by site or planning constraints. In 
general the standard house type has been accepted as a positive benefit in 
achieving quality improvements; connected to reduced design time, and the 
ability to use standard approaches and repetition in building the houses. This 
has advantages in terms of improving contractor processes on each unit and 
scheme, and enabling learning to be passed from one scheme to the next. 
9.13 There has been a focus on achieving best quality within the budget in the 
selection of these components, which is a benefit of the scale of the 
development programme. One example of this is the reduction in the price of 
aluminium clad windows to the equivalent price of timber only windows, 
experienced in the delivery of the Devanha programme. This has resulted in 
the higher specification window being used as standard. This offers an 
increase in quality and potential savings of £10k per annum in maintenance 
costs to the RSL. However, this advantage has not been shared across the 
whole programme where four or five different window types are used. 
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9.14 The economic conditions that Devanha experienced resulted in highly 
competitive prices for some components. Where prices had been fixed this 
advantage was reduced. However, price certainty meant that Devanha could 
forecast spending more effectively.  There does not appear to be a consistent 
pattern on the cost savings offered by bulk procurement and the framework 
agreement. Some cross programme advantages have been available due to 
the scale of Devanha, primarily associated with continuity of work for suppliers 
and sub-contractors. Specifications were different between RSLs, architects 
and contractors on individual schemes, and while efforts were made to 
consolidate specification to a programme level, this was often after schemes 
had been designed to a detailed level.  
9.15 Significant learning from the specification development was shared by the 
Core and Performance Improvement groups throughout Devanha. It is 
recognised that putting this learning into practice has been affected by the 
timing of scheme delivery. Some difficulties arose in negotiating with some of 
the suppliers. These difficulties include: failure to achieve a good price; 
continuity of supply from smaller sub-contractors; quality of components. 
9.16 The Devanha Specification was used across the whole programme. The 
schemes evaluated in 2008 all used the standard specification without any 
significant changes. There is evidence of some significant changes being 
made to specification in the new schemes from 2009 onward. All schemes 
used the Devanha specification for the basis of the design during validation 
stage. Six schemes made significant changes to the specification. In three 
cases this was due to the location or type of unit: Timmermarket is providing 
flats above a medical centre; Mintlaw 2 Sheltered and Holland Street both had 
special tenant requirements. The other three schemes that had significant 
differences to the Devanha specification were making use of innovative 
methods of construction. Two of the schemes have been super-insulated 
which removes the need for central heating. The other scheme has been 
insulated to a very high standard.  
9.17 The final scheme to be delivered by Devanha is the large Donside project. 
This scheme is currently under development and incorporates a range of 
innovative features. It is anticipated that this scheme will incorporate learning 
from earlier schemes. However, ambitious design solutions have resulted in 
complexities in the delivery of the scheme. The difficult nature of the site 
(contaminated industrial land; flooding; access) has created further problems, 
although this would have been the case regardless of how the project was 
procured. This scheme was seen as the flagship project. Due to a range of 
factors it may not offer the benefits aspired to by working in a framework 
agreement. 
9.18 Devanha committed to explore the potential for new innovation and modern 
methods of construction. The focus of activity was on the development of off-
site timber frame construction, resulting in the adoption of a number of 
innovations in the use of timber. This included cassette floor panels, closed-
panel wall construction and refining of the timber frame products. While these 
are not unusual or particularly large step changes, they offered opportunities 
for process improvement, and quality improvements in the housing. The 
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contractors who were involved in developing improved timber components 
and frames benefitted from this process in terms of increasing expertise and 
market advantage that this potentially offers. This had an immediate 
reciprocal benefit to Devanha in the quality of the housing being offered. 
9.19 Incorporation of bathroom „Pods‟ into the construction, and their costing were 
explored extensively. This included site visits to manufacturers and 
investigation into the delivery of „Pods‟ by a framework contractor. However, it 
was concluded that „Pods‟ were not likely to offer any significant cost savings. 
Difficulties were also identified with co-ordination of the „Pods‟ into the overall 
construction and if any later adaptations were required by tenants.  
9.20 Off-site fabrication of large scale timber frame panels was utilised on a 
number of schemes. While cost savings are not evident, it is anticipated that 
improved quality for the same cost as on-site construction will be the main 
benefit for Devanha adopting this approach. 
Conclusions 
 
9.21 The housing and quality standards achieved by Devanha have generally been 
very good. The approach to improving quality has been driven by a 
commitment by the stakeholders to achieving a high standard of housing. The 
focus of the Devanha programme has been on the reduction of cost, as per 
the agreed targets. This has made the target of increasing quality extremely 
challenging. Nevertheless, this has been achieved in many ways across the 
programme. These range from improved quality in window specification to 
whole timber frames, and have generally been achieved by a consistent and 
determined approach by all stakeholders to improving the quality of the 
housing.  
9.22 Where this has been less successful is the timing of improvement initiatives 
(workshops; sharing of lessons learned) occurring after significant design 
decisions have been made. This would have been improved by agreement at 
a very early stage in the framework on key cross programme quality and 
specification issues. The pressure of reducing costs has removed some of the 
opportunity to explore innovative approaches, like pod-construction, due to a 
concern over cost risk. This has possibly reduced the uptake of innovative 
approaches and products at programme level that may have offered quality 
and cost benefits. 
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10 FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT  
 
10.1 The „Framework Agreement‟ agreed by Devanha has set out a number of 
objectives. This led to the development of KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) 
to assess the overall performance of the programme delivery. These KPIs 
were used to evaluate key areas which were considered important to the 
success of the initiative. Some of the KPIs set out in the original agreement 
were not retained due to difficulties in measurement (eliminate the adversarial 
approach; enhancement of service provider‟s reputation). Several KPIs were 
used to establish the Incentivisation Model which was based in the principle of 
Gain-share/Pain-share. These KPIs are: Zero health and safety incidents; 
Greater predictability of out-turn cost and programme; and Right first time with 
zero defects. They were measured and used to establish the financial pain or 
gain shared by the contractor and client. 
Key Performance Indicators 
 
10.2 Zero health and safety incidents: Scheme reports show eight „reportable 
accidents‟ across the programme of works on site. The overall record is very 
good for Devanha, and demonstrates a high standard of working conditions 
with the framework contractors.  
10.3 Predictability of programme: This was forecast at two points, scheme approval 
and at practical completion. At scheme approval there seems to be far less 
predictability than at practical completion. This is as expected, due to more 
complete information on site conditions and the exact nature of construction 
programme at practical completion stage. Once on site schemes appear to 
have been managed well in terms of completion times. Data is available for 29 
schemes of which 11 schemes had reached completion ahead of the planned 
date, a further 11 had completed on time. Only 7 schemes had completed 
later than contractually agreed. Generally the programme of works has had a 
very good record of programme predictability. The Section 75 schemes, 
where the Framework Agreement was not applicable, appear to have a similar 
predictability, so there is no evidence to suggest that the framework 
agreement is the cause of the good performance on programme. 
10.4 Defects: The incidence of defects has been highly variable. This appears to 
have been as a result of the different interpretation of defects made by clerks 
of works. In some cases individual marks on walls were recorded individually, 
while the same scale of defect may be recorded as a single defect on another 
scheme. The scheme reports show some schemes with 8 defects and others 
with over 100. The inconsistency has been a source of frustration for some of 
the stakeholders, with a direct influence on the pain share apportioned to 
contractors. 
Framework Objectives 
 
10.5 Other objectives included in the framework, but not used within the within 
incentivisation model for Devanha are:   
  50 
 Team working and consideration of others;  
 Eliminate adversarial approach;  
 Employer and tenant satisfaction;  
 Enhancement of Service Provider‟s reputation; 
 Improvements in quality, productivity and value for money; 
 Improvements in environmental performance. 
 
10.6 Two of the KPIs are incorporated in the framework agreement: Team working 
and consideration of others; and Eliminate adversarial approach. A diagnostic 
tool was used by the procurement consultant to capture many aspects of the 
team working and collaborative approach that are being fostered through 
Devanha. Areas which ranked highly were: Collaboration and team work is a 
focus for senior management; Trust between „Managers‟ and „people‟; Good 
communication supporting collaboration; and Collaboration leading to reduced 
programme times‟. Devanha members recognised the importance of 
teamworking, however, evidence from workshops and interviews suggests 
that „teams‟ for the delivery of individual schemes had been dependent on the 
individual personalities involved.  
10.7 All of the individual RSL partners in Devanha Phase 2 have tenant satisfaction 
surveys that are conducted with new tenants. It was the intention of Devanha 
to adopt a programme-wide approach to evaluation tenant satisfaction. This 
has not been established and it is not possible to evaluate if there has been 
any improvement in tenant satisfaction between pre-Devanha schemes and 
the housing that has been procured through the framework. The RSLs are 
satisfied that the housing is of a high standard, and generally the quality has 
improved. The improved thermal performance of the Devanha schemes 
should also deliver lower fuel costs to tenants.  
10.8 Devanha Phase 2 has taken place during a sharp UK wide economic 
downturn in the construction industry. Members of Devanha believe that the 
programme activity has protected the individual consultants and contractors to 
a certain degree. The continuity of work through the programme has enabled 
the companies to reduce or avoid redundancies but it is not possible to 
quantify the effect that Devanha may have had on the economic well-being of 
the companies involved.  
10.9 The legacy of Devanha for the consultants and contractors involved is varied. 
Some recognise the valuable experience gained by using new procurement 
approaches, and the introduction of open-book costing, lean construction 
methods, and innovative technologies. However, we have no evidence on 
whether the service providers‟ reputations have been enhanced. 
10.10  Improvements in quality and environmental performance are evident in most 
of the schemes delivered by Devanha. The detail of this is dealt with in the 
previous chapter. These objectives were always in competition with the 
objective of reducing costs. That Devanha developed a range of schemes 
with consistently high quality and reduced environmental impact is a very 
positive outcome. 
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11 TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
11.1 Part 9 of the Offer of Grant set a condition that Devanha would use the 
financial investment as “a catalyst to help train and provide additional 
employment opportunities for local people.” (p31)  Devanha was set specific 
targets relating to process and outcomes. The key target was to deliver up to 
150 additional Modern Apprenticeships and other employment and training 
opportunities over the period of the approved projects. 
11.2 Devanha set up an initiative known as “Devanha Train” and employed a 
consultant, Engage Consulting, to co-ordinate this initiative. In the early 
stages of Devanha, the three framework contractors were involved in setting 
up these processes and opportunities for extending into the supply chain were 
explored. 
11.3 As Devanha developed, it concentrated on the key targets of cost and grant 
efficiencies and other targets including training and employment received less 
attention. In the summer of 2008, Devanha decided not to continue to employ 
Engage Consulting. 
11.4 The changed economic circumstances from 2008 called the attainment of 
targets for recruitment and training into question. Although a positive 
approach to training and employment was one of the selection criteria for 
appointing framework contractors, the main concern had became retention of 
qualified staff at a time of widespread redundancies elsewhere in the 
construction industry.   
Setting Targets and Measuring Performance against Targets 
 
11.5 Nevertheless, Devanha Train adopted a model developed by the Glasgow 
Housing Association based on the value of labour content in a contract as a 
whole and designed to give the necessary flexibility to account for the 
situation where an individual only spends part of their time on any one project. 
The results of this model are expressed in person weeks. Heriot-Watt 
University adopted this approach in gathering data for the M&E study and also 
sought data on „additionality‟, i.e. the number of people who would not have 
been employed without the Devanha programme. 
11.6 For each project data was sought on the total employment and training 
opportunities and this was divided into three subgroups based on Devanha‟s 
priorities: 
 New entrant trainees 
 Targeted recruitment 
 Unwaged work experience placements 
 
11.7 It is perhaps indicative of the lower priority given to the training and 
employment objectives that Devanha was never able to complete monitoring 
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forms for all of the projects. Also, despite initial attempts by Engage 
Consulting to involve the section 75 developers, no returns were ever 
received from these. It is not possible to use the terms of the section 75 
agreement itself to encourage involvement in training and employment 
initiatives as these are non-planning matters such. To achieve closer 
involvement of these developers would therefore require specific agreement 
between each developer and Devanha. 
Performance against Targets 
 
11.8 Summary data for the whole programme was available for the three 
framework contractors and detailed data was available from 23 projects, 21 of 
which had reached Practical Completion and two of which were still on site. 
All data was from framework schemes, none from Section 75 schemes. 
11.9 Framework contractors provided summary figures for all apprentices taken on 
between the start of the programme and March 2012. At that time all but three 
small projects (all nearing completion) and the large Donside project were 
complete. Figures can be taken as close to the final number for the Devanha 
project as a whole. Data related to apprentices taken on since the start of the 
programme as a direct result of Devanha, some of whom may have 
subsequently completed their apprenticeships and not all were necessarily 
currently employed by the contractors. 
Table 11.1 Apprentices 
Firm Apprentices 
Bancon 12 
CHAP 14 
Robertsons 11 
All Framework Contractors 37 
Source: Devanha monitoring returns 
 
11.10 Table 11.1 shows the total number of apprentices taken on by all contractors 
as a result of Devanha. This is just under a quarter of the original target of 
150. However, it is likely that apprentices were also taken on by section 75 
developers and it would be unfair to judge the contractors against the original 
target given the economic circumstances. In interviews in March 2012 
contractors suggested they were taking on 3 or 4 apprentices per year which 
was a continuation of their existing policy. One noted that they had a 
continuing policy of recruiting school leavers and new trainees. 
11.11 Targets were set for three categories of recruitment as shown in table 11.2: 
new entrant trainees5, targeted employment (which includes those identified 
through social enterprises) and a small number of unwaged placements for 
individuals. Targets were expressed in terms of the percentage of hours 
worked by each category of employee compared with the total number of 
hours worked on site by all employees. 
                                            
5 New entrant trainee does not mean apprentices – these are identified in table 11.1. 
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Table 11.2: Targeted Recruitment (Person Weeks as Percentage of Total Weeks 
Worked by All Employees) 
 Target 
(Percent) 
Main 
Contractor 
Actual 
(Percent) 
Sub 
Contractors 
Actual 
(Percent) 
Total  
Actual 
(Percent) 
New Entrant Trainee 10 7 1 4 
Targeted Recruits 20 4 1 2 
Unwaged Placements 3 0.4 0 0.2 
Data from sample of 23 projects for which detailed data was available. 
 
11.12 Table 11.2 shows that the projects performed less well than original targets in 
relation to all three identified recruitment groups. Contractors were able to 
come closer to targets for direct employees but had very little impact on 
subcontractors. Although limited, most success was gained in bringing in new 
entrant trainees. Targeted recruits were those such as long term unemployed 
or people with specific barriers to employment identified as difficult to place by 
social enterprise organisations. The absence of a dedicated employment 
consultant providing support may have impacted on recruitment from this 
group but they will also have found employment harder to get in the 
recession. There were very few unwaged placements, none with sub 
contractors. 
Table 11.3 Number of separate individuals employed in each category 
 Actual 
Number 
Actual 
Percent 
All employees 2881 100 
New Entrant Trainee 55 1.9 
Targeted Recruits 35 1.2 
Unwaged Placements 26 0.9 
Data from sample of 23 projects for which detailed data was available. 
 
11.13 Table 11.3 expresses recruitment of target groups in terms of the total number 
of the cumulative number of people employed in each group throughout the 
whole programme. The 23 projects can be seen to have provided employment 
for a large number of people at some point during their execution6. The 
numbers of new employees in the target groups who gained access to 
employment was small.  
11.14 A large programme such as Devanha provides opportunities for employment 
beyond the contractors and subcontractors working directly on the sites. Data 
collected in March 2011 shows Devanha‟s impact on other employment. 
 
                                            
6 There will be double counting where individuals have worked on more than one site. 
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Table 11.4 Non-Contracting New Staff Employed as a Direct Result of Devanha 
(persons) 
Type of Firm Number of staff taken 
on since start of 
Devanha1 
Number (from 
previous column) 
Currently Employed2 
RSL 0 0 
Devanha 1 0 
Architects 2 1 
Surveyors 12 7 
Engineers 8 6 
Other Consulting firms 0 0 
Suppliers 11 11 
Others 0 0 
Total 34 25 
1. Taken on since start - means taken on as a result of Devanha work. 
2. Currently employed refers to anyone in category 1 who is still working for the firm (Devanha employee not 
included as he was about to be made redundant).  
 
11.15 From the data supplied, it appears that 34 people gained at least temporary 
employment as a result of Devanha and 25 of these are currently retained 
despite Devanha‟s programme coming to an end. Most of these jobs are in 
professional firms but there is no information on the nature of the jobs. The 
number of supplier jobs is an estimate and the basis of this figure is not 
known. 
Conclusions 
11.16 The recruitment and training targets set for Devanha have not been achieved 
but this is against a background of largescale redundancies in the 
construction industry as a whole. The continuity of work represented by 
Devanha has been beneficial to the firms involved and the emphasis has 
been on retaining staff, including apprentices rather than creating new 
positions. 
11.17 Nevertheless, framework contractors have taken on 37 apprentices as a result 
of Devanha work and also over 100 new recruits and trainees, although not 
necessarily on a permanent basis. In addition, data suggests that 25 
additional posts have been created amongst consultants, suppliers and other 
employers as a result of Devanha. 
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12 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
Local authorities have been strategic partners in delivery of affordable 
housing since before the inception of Devanha. Moreover, the strategic and 
delivery roles of local authorities throughout Scotland have grown significantly 
over the period in which Devanha has operated, with the growing importance 
of the Strategic Housing Investment Plan (SHIP), including changes in the 
current year. Devanha operates over three separate local authority areas: 
Aberdeen City, Aberdeenshire and Moray. 
12.2 The relationship between Devanha and the three local authorities is important 
to the success of the initiative and has been explored through interviews with 
senior local authority staff and in consultations with the Devanha Board. Data 
collected also examined how delivery had compared with the initial intentions 
of the Devanha Offer of Grant. 
Devanha Objectives  
12.3 The local authorities did not feel involved in setting Devanha‟s objectives and 
saw it as a bulk procurement initiative which sought to achieve cost and grant 
efficiencies and quality improvements. Their experienced was coloured by a 
lack of external coherence on the part of Devanha and a feeling that individual 
RSLs continued to work to their own rather than Devanha‟s agenda. In those 
local authority areas where the majority of the programme was centred – 
Aberdeenshire and Aberdeen City - there was a general feeling that Devanha 
had been positive in delivering a large programme. For reasons discussed 
below, the impression held by Moray was less positive, although Moray 
representatives were a little more positive about Devanha by the end of the 
programme. 
12.4 The lack of external cohesion of Devanha was a recurrent theme for all 
authorities and contact had been largely with individual RSLs rather than 
Devanha. An interviewee asked, “What is Devanha? Is it anything?” a view 
which did not really change over the period of the programme. Nevertheless, 
local authorities did engage with Devanha through its member RSLs, 
providing significant support in the form of grant funding and, in one authority, 
the existence of a large Devanha programme had allowed a more strategic 
view of land allocation.  
Delivery Issues 
12.5 A multi-year, multi-area programme such as Devanha required co-ordination 
of the programme and had to meet the differing housing needs and objectives 
of three different authorities. This inevitably created more complexity than a 
traditional one year Affordable Housing Investment Programme (AHIP) in a 
single area. Communication and control over the timing of delivery have 
therefore been of particular importance. For reasons within and outwith its 
control, Devanha has not performed well in either of these respects.  
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12.6 The programme was not split evenly across the three local authorities. At the 
end of the first year delivery was skewed towards Aberdeenshire and to a 
lesser extent to Aberdeen City although by the time the programme was 
complete this had evened out to be nearer the programme target as shown in 
table 12.1.  
 
Table 12.1: Projects at Scheme Validation Stage 
Local Authority June 
2008 
Final 
Split 
 
Aberdeen City 6 15 
Aberdeenshire 10 28 
Moray 0 8 
Source: M&E Round 1 & Round 3 Data Capture Forms plus additional data supplied by Devanha 
 
12.7 The programme‟s slow start exacerbated the sense of unfairness and led to 
an underspend on the AHIP in Moray. Lack of communication between 
Devanha and the local authorities over the programme delays created further 
tensions. 
12.8 A stronger and more engaged external face to Devanha would have improved 
its image and helped it to manage these difficulties. However, Devanha‟s final 
performance in managing the programme across the three local authorities 
was very good, with the proportion of final unit output close that agreed at 
Offer of Grant stage as shown in table 12.2. 
 
Table 12.2 Proportional Split of Unit Output by Local Authority  
 Aberdeen 
City 
Aberdeenshire Moray Total 
Offer of Grant 43% 44%  13%  1563 
Validation 41% 47% 12% 1383 
Source: M&E Round 1 & Round 3 Data Capture Forms plus additional data supplied by Devanha 
 
12.9 A strong perception emerged that Aberdeen City and Shire were the focus of 
the programme. The programme was much smaller in Moray and started 
later. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the Devanha programme in 
Moray was delivered through the Moray Volume Procurement Initiative 
(MVPI3). Although MVPI3 was delivered by one of the Devanha RSLs, it was 
not part of the Framework Agreement but, rather, a series of section 75 
projects which had been negotiated with a single developer. 
12.10 The loss of units from the original target, around 40 from an original 
expectation of 209 was a larger proportion of the original local authority level 
programme and was more keenly felt in Moray than in the other local 
authorities. This resulted in a lower level of satisfaction with the overall 
Devanha experience. Although this is perhaps inevitable given the nature of 
the programme, it could have been handled better by strong strategic 
leadership from Devanha. This is an additional area where the appointment of 
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an MD could have prioritised a vulnerable area of Devanha‟s business. 
Integration with SHIP  
12.11 Over the period of the Devanha programme the role of local authorities at a 
strategic and delivery level has increased and the SHIP has taken a central 
place in strategic decision making. Devanha pre-dated the SHIP but local 
authorities found Devanha to be a useful tool in meeting housing need, 
particularly through the use of nominations to housing produced through the 
programme. In Moray the MVPI3 was well integrated with the SHIP but the 
authority did not consult with Devanha on the MVPI3 and Devanha was in 
many respects “just a badge” for delivering MVPI3. 
12.12 A clear message is that local authorities and their delivery partners should 
communicate more fully in the development of a strategic programme for 
delivering affordable housing. Given the changing roles of authorities and 
RSLs and the more complex and challenging funding environment this is even 
more the case than in the past, bringing into focus Devanha‟s ability to 
communicate and present a strong and cohesive face to its external partners. 
Communication 
 
12.13 Local authorities felt that they had not been involved sufficiently in initial 
decisions about setting up Devanha and its programme. Latterly, local 
authority influence increased to some extent. However, local authorities 
continued to have little influence over the detail of the Devanha programme at 
a project level.  
12.14 All of the local authorities considered that communication had been a negative 
aspect of Devanha.  One noted that it was “was only consulted when a 
problem arose and where Scottish Government insisted that Devanha had our 
agreement before Scottish Government would agree to a change. There was 
generally a lack of early and open discussion….we were expected to agree 
with whatever Devanha proposed… [for example] where the RSL wanted to 
change the tenure mix.” This was typical of the way Devanha interacted with 
local authorities. Devanha lacked strong leadership and so could not engage 
strategically with local authorities but instead addressed issues on a scheme 
by scheme, problem solving basis. 
12.15 Outwith the tripartite meetings of the local authority, Scottish Government and 
Devanha, communication tends to be with individual constituent RSLs. 
Relationships with the RSLs were generally good, although it is not always 
clear if the RSL is representing itself or Devanha. 
“There wasn‟t really a day to day relationship with Devanha, to a large extent this 
continued to be with the individual RSLs”. 
 
“There were irregular meeting with Devanha and all three authorities tried to have 
more meetings. But Devanha‟s involvement didn‟t bring anything new to the 
meetings”   
(LA consultation, 2012) 
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Local Authority Support for Devanha 
 
12.16 Throughout the programme, LAs demonstrated their support for Devanha 
through making funding available, transferring land to Devanha RSLs and 
Moray included Devanha as the agent for delivery of the Moray Volume 
Procurement Initiative (MVPI 3). Local authorities, in some cases reluctantly, 
supported Devanha decisions in order to allow schemes to remain viable. For 
example, they agreed to a change of tenure, even where a change to shared 
equity ran counter to the local authority‟s views on the appropriate mix, in 
order to allow a scheme to proceed.  
12.17 This and other examples show that, despite reservations about their lack of 
involvement, authorities remained as supportive partners of Devanha 
throughout the programme. The authorities all welcomed the continuity which 
Devanha had brought to the construction industry in their areas. This was 
seen as beneficial not only to the three framework contractors but also to local 
suppliers.  
Overall satisfaction 
 
12.18 All of the local authorities were positive about some aspects of Devanha; 
Devanha was seen as a good opportunity to work collectively to meet needs 
of the area. The main negative comments related to poor communication and 
to the fall in number of units delivered in comparison to original estimates. 
There was some concern that decisions about reducing numbers of units or 
moving resources between the local authorities had not been discussed 
sufficiently with the authorities.  
12.19 Aberdeen City commented that Devanha had been successful in pulling 
together sites where previously RSL access to sites had been very difficult. It 
had delivered a significant programme over a five year period. A particularly 
positive view in Aberdeenshire reflected the facts that delivery here had 
started early and the total number of units provided fell proportionately less 
than in other areas. 
12.20 In Moray the successful delivery of the MVPI programme was welcomed. This 
was put down as a success in partnership working with the individual RSL. 
Devanha‟s involvement was seen as marginal. Devanha was thought to have 
been more interested in delivery in other areas than in Moray.  
How Could Devanha have been Improved 
12.21 From the LA perspective, Devanha was a complicated organisation without 
clear objectives.  
12.22 All of the local authorities believed that Devanha needed improved 
communications. One summed this up as a need to show that “Devanha 
actually exists”. Local authorities were aware of tensions between Devanha 
members.  
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12.23 Governance was seen as a problem, with RSLs unwilling to give up power 
and responsibility. This would have been improved by Devanha working more 
collectively. Authorities would have liked Devanha to explore the possibility of 
a single development team where shared skills and knowledge could have 
supported and strengthened all of the RSLs. One authority commented that 
the individual RSL staff were very professional but that it was not clear if being 
part of Devanha assisted or constrained them in their work. 
12.24 The problem of relationships extended beyond Devanha to its partners in local 
authorities. Greater input from local authorities in setting up the initiative and 
in setting its goals would have been welcomed. 
The Future 
12.25 Looking to the future, all local authorities saw uncertainty in the coming year. 
Budgets would be small and the ability to start new projects very limited. The 
authorities would try to maximise the use of capacity which existed amongst 
all potential partners including local authority building, RSLs and the private 
sector.   
12.26 Local authorities have concern about where the new affordable housing will 
come from this year. There may be opportunities for the authorities to 
continue council house building. The capacity of organisations to build, based 
on assets and liabilities is now a key consideration. There are very few RSL 
projects in the pipeline with ownership and planning permission in place and 
an organisation such as Devanha could play a part in pulling together sites. 
There was a concern a return to individual RSL programmes may be a 
backward step in this respect. 
12.27 The local authorities were supportive in principle of a collaborative approach 
to delivering new affordable housing. It was suggested that this could increase 
capacity in comparison to individual RSLs, some of whom have little or no 
capacity. In this context there could be negotiations over a future role for a 
Devanha-like organisation. However, there had been no approach to any of 
the local authorities from Devanha for inclusion in the local authority SHIPs 
which were being prepared at the time the local authority interviews were 
being carried out in late February and early March 2012. 
12.28 Looking to the medium term, the local authorities welcomed their increased 
strategic role in delivery of affordable housing. They saw a more co-ordinated 
approach, where they could bring together resources from across the public, 
RSL and private sectors as potentially beneficial. This could open up options 
for involvement but “no-one was speaking for Devanha”. 
12.29 A local authority suggested that there was potential for developing a grouping, 
including a local authority in a co-ordinated approach. The local authority 
could take a lead strategic role but could be involved as an equal partner in 
delivery. In such a situation it was suggested that Devanha could conceivably 
work as a lead developer or preferred partner. However, it was emphasised 
that such an approach would be “very much dependent on getting governance 
right”.  
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12.30 Another authority suggested it could not deliver the whole programme over 
the next three years. It would look at all delivery options including a preferred 
developer or site by site competition. The council did not rule out Devanha‟s 
involvement in such an approach.  
12.31 Devanha‟s good reputation in delivering quality is a factor in opening up 
possible future opportunities. Notably, Aberdeenshire Council has been 
running a demonstration in building new local authority housing: developing 
with the Devanha spec, developing with a council architect spec and a private 
developer spec. This demonstrates possible advantages of the council 
working collaboratively with others, such as Devanha, in delivery in the new 
affordable housing system. 
12.32 The Aberdeen City interviewee believed that there was a continuing role for 
an RSL collective whether that was Devanha or something else completely. 
The City was concerned that the local RSLs may be too small to raise finance 
individually but hopeful that they may have greater capacity if working 
together. Devanha had demonstrated that bigger sites, such as Arran Avenue 
with around 100 units and Donside with over 200 units, could be developed 
where two RSLs worked together. On the other hand, Devanha was not the 
only possibility and, without expressing a preference for this, the interviewee 
noted that national RSLs may be able to develop bigger sites alone, possibly 
with local RSL management. 
12.33 The Moray interviewee considered that whether Devanha would be involved 
would depend to a large extent on the criteria the council establishes for 
partnership working. Devanha has some advantages in having housing 
management infrastructure in the area already. This could be preferable to 
involvement of an outside organisation which has no existing stock in Moray. 
12.34 This should be balanced by the view that Moray had felt peripheral to 
Devanha. It was noted that, ideally, if repeated, a bulk procurement initiative 
would be based in Moray only although the council understood that may not 
be practicable because of size of programme not being large enough. Future 
involvement of Devanha would have to address this issue. 
12.35 In Aberdeenshire it was stated that consideration can be given to working with 
Devanha in future. Devanha had experience of collaboration which could be 
tapped into and be beneficial in meeting the council‟s strategic objectives 
through partnership. Devanha could be involved but it will need to reconsider 
its operation, governance and financing and work beyond just new housing in, 
for example, in stock improvement, retro-fit and energy efficiency in existing 
stock. 
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13 EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
13.1 This chapter summarises the overall evaluation of Devanha and discusses 
transferable lessons learned from the Devanha experience. It focuses on: 
 Value for Money 
 Process Improvement 
 Collaboration 
 Programme Management 
 Governance 
 Strategic Relationships 
 Training & Employment 
 
Value for Money 
Evaluation of Performance against Cost and HAG Targets 
13.2 We considered performance against cost and grant targets and looked at 
some high level disaggregation of this performance: framework agreement 
projects and section 75 developers; tenure; and tranche. Data showed that 
there was no discernible pattern in performance between tranches and so no 
breakdown at this level is presented. Figures shown in this section relate to 
the 35 schemes for which actual costs were available. While the detailed 
figures vary a little between the 35 schemes and the full 51 schemes, the 
differences are not significant and do not alter the conclusions. 
Table 13.1 Actual Works Cost Compared to Offer of Grant Target 
Category Variation From Offer of 
Grant Target 
Met Target (Yes/No) 
Whole Programme +4.22% No 
Rental Schemes +4.36% No 
Shared Equity Schemes +3.60% No 
Framework Schemes +9.36% No 
Non Framework Schemes -2.78% Yes 
Based on 35 completed schemes where Actual Cost data was available. 
 
Table 13.2 Actual HAG Level Compared to Offer of Grant Target 
Category Variation From Offer of 
Grant Target 
Met Target (Yes/No) 
Whole Programme -9.22% Yes 
Rental Schemes -8.98% Yes 
Shared Equity Schemes -10.56% Yes 
Framework Schemes -0.33% Yes 
Non Framework Schemes -20% Yes 
Based on 35 completed schemes where Actual HAG data was available. 
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While the programme as a whole and all of the sub categories met the Devanha 
Offer of Grant target for HAG, only the non-framework schemes met this target for 
works cost.  
 
Value for Money  
13.3 The evaluation of value for money is complicated by the extreme changes 
which occurred in the economy as a whole. It is further complicated by a 
completely changed grant system which means that grant levels experienced 
by Devanha are well in excess of those being awarded today. Qualitative 
opinion from Devanha and its partners suggested that value for money may 
have been obtained through pain/gain share but that in the particular 
economic circumstances pertaining at the time, further savings could have 
been achieved by going out to the market to tender for individual schemes. 
13.4 Works Cost: While commenting that Devanha works cost targets do not 
appear to have been based on evidence that they were achievable, Devanha 
has failed to deliver value for money against this benchmark. An exception 
has been the non-framework schemes which outperformed this target. 
13.5 HAG: Against the benchmark set out in the Offer of Grant, Devanha has 
achieved value for money for the programme as a whole and for all of the sub 
categories of rented/shared equity and framework/non-framework schemes. 
13.6 Adjusted Target: It is arguable whether the final adjusted target is a more 
useful benchmark of procurement efficiency. It was the basis of gain/pain 
share calculation in the 35 schemes where actual costs are known. Sixteen 
schemes performed better than this target and were in a gain situation and 14 
met the target. Only 5 schemes experienced pain. On the basis of this 
measure of value for money the majority of schemes have performed to the 
adjusted target or better at the actual cost stage. 
13.7 However, it can be argued that it is in the contractors‟ interests to revise this 
adjusted target upward through the compensation events mechanism. Of 
course, their view was that it was only used for legitimate extras as intended 
by NEC to recover actual additional costs incurred through no fault of their 
own. Conversely the procurement consultant‟s view was that contractors used 
this as an old fashioned claims approach and were not committed to 
achieving lowest cost possible. The Devanha consultants‟ view was that they 
saw the Scottish Government Validated target as the 'real' target. 
13.8 Scottish Government Validated Target: Comparing actual costs with 
Scottish Government validated works cost targets shows that, at aggregate 
level, schemes have actually been delivered within this target (table 6.3 
refers). This raises the question of what is the „real‟ or most appropriate and 
realistic target against which to gauge performance. The Offer of Grant target 
was widely considered to be unrealistically low and generally unachievable, 
but conversely the SG validated targets were a crude benchmark that did little 
to challenge performance or incentivise contractors to minimise costs. 
Furthermore the gap between target setting and starting on site could be a 
matter of months, by which time the market had changed considerably. It was 
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observed that some of the more “successful” schemes were the ones where 
the target was set at the peak of the marketplace. 
13.9 The following table highlights transferable lessons from Devanha in relation to 
assessing value for money. 
Table 13.3 Transferable Lessons: Value for Money  
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. A single works cost target benchmark 
was used in the Offer of Grant. This was 
simple and easy to express and 
understand but too simplistic to be 
meaningful at scheme level as it doesn‟t 
account for site specific risks.  
A more refined mechanism for 
establishing scheme level target 
cost would be necessary. 
b. Although Devanha agreed the ambitious 
Offer of Grant target it was quickly 
regarded as unachievable. There was a 
lack of awareness amongst those 
delivering the projects and it was not 
used to drive performance. 
There should be more emphasis 
on involvement of  framework 
partners in understanding cost 
targets to improve buy-in.  
c. A number of KPIs were used in the 
contract to incentivise performance and 
inform gain share/pain share on 
schemes. However, KPIs were not well 
defined or understood at the outset to 
clearly drive performance. 
 
Establish and clearly 
communicate KPIs to all partners 
in a framework arrangement from 
the outset to give clearer direction. 
Promote better understanding of 
target cost concept of NEC. 
d. Value for Money criteria were limited to 
capital cost target. This was simple and 
readily understood and measured. 
However, it lacks important value criteria 
including design quality, sustainability, 
life cycle costing. 
Consider a number of VFM 
metrics in addition to capital cost. 
 
e. Devanha introduced a new procurement 
approach and way of working not 
previously experienced in the area. The 
Devanha legacy has been to develop 
procurement skills and experience in the 
North East construction sector. 
Although the value of this is not 
measurable within Devanha terms 
of reference, an innovative 
approach to procurement 
increases skills and capacity in 
the industry. 
 
Evaluation of Process Improvement 
13.10 Higher levels of collaboration than experienced through traditional 
procurement were achieved. Consequent benefits of better communication, 
trust, open book costing and sharing of buildability experience were attained.  
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13.11 On the other hand, lack of understanding and experience of the NEC 
procurement process that is fundamental to operational aspects of Devanha 
procurement are clear, despite the engagement of a procurement consultant 
from the outset. Difficulties relating to the operational aspects of implementing 
the NEC Devanha approach hampered Devanha for a large part of the 
duration of the initiative. 
13.12 Incremental improvements in efficiency gains/cost savings year on year from 
the Devanha framework approach were not evident. As such the influence of 
the Devanha process on VFM and cost savings at scheme level is difficult to 
evaluate. 
13.13 Table 13.4 shows transferrable lessons from the Devanha experience in 
relation to procurement process issues. 
Table 13.4 Transferable Lessons: Procurement Process 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. The selection process for Devanha 
partners didn‟t sufficiently consider 
compatibility with a framework approach. 
There was a sense that not all partners 
fully bought into NEC target cost 
approach and behaved as if traditional 
procurement. 
Amend the selection and 
appointment process to be more 
specifically suited to framework 
contracts. 
b. All programme workload was allocated to 
contractors at outset. This is a 
comparatively simple and straightforward 
process but limits ability to review 
performance and competitiveness mid 
programme. 
Consider staged allocation of 
framework workload based on 
performance. 
c. Devanha procurement consultant also 
carried out assessments used to set 
validated works costs targets. While 
carried out to professional standard this 
lacks independence as procurement 
consultant has a vested interest in 
inflation assessment. 
Consider independent third party 
assessment of any inflation 
adjustment to cost targets. 
d. Price Data for inflation assessment 
largely derived from within Devanha 
partners. Price Data does not effectively 
represent open market inflation 
conditions. 
While this was unavoidable due to 
lack of available comparators, 
greater confidence in qualitative 
assessments needed would have 
been given by using a third party 
consultant. 
e. There was an absence of knowledge and 
experience of NEC within Devanha 
Carefully consider whether the 
NEC procurement approach is 
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partners. Cultural readiness and 
operational capability therefore took a 
long time to develop. 
appropriate for the programme. 
Possibly modify/adapt to suit. 
f. Many schemes were partially or fully 
developed before framework approach 
adopted. Opportunity was therefore lost 
at early stages for Core Group input 
limiting effectiveness of NEC approach.  
 
Ensure early involvement of 
supply chain in framework 
approach to harness benefits. 
g. Devanha framework approach adopted 
the NEC 3 form of contract. CWC and 
Devanha considered a variety of forms of 
contract at a workshop. 
NEC3 enabled a level of collaboration 
and integration in the Core Group not 
seen in traditional procurement but 
significant risks are still retained by the 
client under NEC3. 
Carry out thorough assessment of 
alternative procurement routes 
and contracts. Pay particular 
attention to risk aspects of all 
contractual arrangements which 
are considered. 
h. Some aspects of an identifiable Devanha 
specification evolved over time. This 
allowed for limited economy of scale 
benefits to be achieved for some 
elements. On the other hand, lack of 
comprehensive Devanha specification 
meant that full bulk buying potential was 
not achieved. Opportunity for more 
strategic involvement of subcontractors 
could not be achieved. 
There should be more integration 
of partners at outset to establish 
and define an agreed 
specification. 
 
Evaluation of Collaboration 
13.14 Devanha was partially successful in implementing collaborative working. 
Some aspects of the NEC approach were implemented but only partially and 
they were still being developed late in the programme. Table 13.5 indicates 
learning points from this experience.  
Table 13.5 Transferable Lessons: Collaboration 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. The Strategic Client Group 
promoted collaborative systems 
from a client perspective e.g. in 
implementing the framework 
agreement. However, this was 
criticised as taking too long to 
get underway. 
There is a need for focus on developing 
collaborative working from an early stage. 
This requires leadership, professional 
support and commitment from the Board. 
b. Procurement consultants were 
engaged to advise on NEC 
approach. They provided 
Carefully consider remit and terms of 
engagement of procurement consultant in 
future. Emphasise the mentoring role in 
  66 
access to the required 
knowledge and experience of 
NEC approach which was 
absent. However, training 
workshops achieved little; 
knowledge transfer was 
superficial and did not extend to 
practice and application. 
 
supporting operational and implementation 
aspects. Ensure that the client has a 
dedicated project manager to oversee the 
procurement consultant project. Consider 
whether scheme PM role should be 
extended where experience in team is 
absent. 
c. The Core group provided a 
route for communication for 
partners including sharing 
learning. The procurement 
consultant and Programme 
Director considered it could 
have been more proactive. 
A core group involving the client and 
partners is essential for enhancing 
collaborative working and sharing of ideas 
which can improve quality. It should be set 
up early in the programme to advance good 
working practices and involve partners in 
specification issues e.g. related to 
buildability. It is important that staff 
delivering development are involved. 
d. Open book costing and NEC 
framework meant sharing of 
savings but in securing longer 
term collaboration some market 
testing and price advantages in 
a falling market were lost. 
There is a trade off between competition 
and collaboration. In a falling market the 
client may lose out on windfall gains. 
Nevertheless, the wider benefits of 
collaboration are accepted and partners 
should operate framework agreements to 
maximise efficiency, e.g. through 
commitment to beating target costs and 
staged allocation of contracts. 
e. There was a generally non-
confrontational approach which 
was assisted by the NEC 
contract use of compensation 
events. This did, however, 
leave the client with significant 
responsibility for risk. 
Carefully consider the contract to be 
adopted including suitability for 
collaborative approach and impact on risk.  
f. Collaboration was almost 
exclusively with first tier 
contractors. 
Efforts should be made to expand 
collaborative working within the supply 
chain. 
 
Evaluation of Performance in Programme Management 
13.15 Overall, Devanha is in the closing stages of managing a substantial 
programme to a successful completion based on delivery of 1,383 units while 
meeting grant targets. Table 13.6 shows transferable lessons from the 
Devanha experience in relation to Programme Management.  
  67 
Table 13.6 Transferable Lessons: Programme Management 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. Four year programme. Multi year programme gives opportunities for 
continuity of work using a framework 
agreement. 
b. Interim year-on-year grant 
planning targets. 
Interim targets are useful for overall programme 
management but should be used with as much 
flexibility as possible. 
c. Innovative approach to 
project approval associated 
with project delays. Delays 
caused damage to 
Devanha‟s reputation. 
Light touch approval gives greater control to 
RSLs and should be encouraged. However, 
there is a need for a common understanding of 
the parameters of scheme assessment to be 
established early as delays in reaching 
agreement on individual schemes can have a 
major impact on programme success. 
Processes should be tested before the start of 
the main programme. 
 
Evaluation of Devanha’s Governance 
13.16 Devanha‟s governance structure and systems have reflected the tensions 
between ceding control to the Devanha Board and RSLs‟ desire to retain 
control. Over the course of Devanha, the RSLs became more comfortable 
working together in Devanha but difficult issues remained in relation to 
apportionment of risk. Devanha also recognised that lack of strong leadership 
had hampered its performance in a number of ways. 
13.17 Table 13.7 highlights transferable lessons in relation to governance. These 
relate largely to roles and responsibilities, leadership, risk, monitoring and 
control. 
Table 13.7 Transferable Lessons: Governance 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. Board of 10 directors – two 
each from each RSL. 
The Board composition should be designed to 
enable more independent scrutiny. It is 
reasonable for the RSLs to nominate members 
for the Devanha board, but independence of 
the board should be enhanced. This should be 
achieved by a minority membership from RSL 
executives, and inclusion of independent Board 
members with no affiliation to any of the RSLs. 
This should help minimise conflicts of interest 
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and make decision making more efficient. 
b. Governance sub-structure 
with 6 subgroups allowed 
RSLs to stay involved but 
was slow set up. Strategic 
Client Group particularly 
useful. Others were 
periodically used. 
The sub-structure should be simplified. An 
efficient Devanha executive and staffing 
structure would reduce the requirement for a 
bureaucratic governance sub-structure. Ad-hoc 
sub-groups could be convened where expertise 
and individual RSL policy views are required 
but on an exception basis. More use should be 
made of the Core Group as an operational 
rather than strategic group. 
c. Senior leadership – 
Devanha failed to appoint a 
managing director and this 
weakness was 
demonstrated repeatedly in 
many aspects of Devanha‟s 
operation. 
Any future collaborative programme should 
have a leader – Managing Director - from the 
start with a development team, probably 
seconded from the existing RSLs to enable 
effective implementation. Reporting lines of the 
development staff would be through the 
Devanha MD. 
d. Employment of Programme 
Director. 
This role will not be necessary if there is a 
managing director and development team in 
place. 
e. Day-to-day control of 
projects by RSLs allowed 
use of existing expertise 
and local control but did not 
give clear lines of 
responsibility, reduced 
opportunities for 
standardisation and caused 
confusion for external 
bodies with lack of branding 
of Devanha. 
All projects which are part of the collaborative 
programme should be the responsibility of 
Devanha. Staff working on the projects should 
be responsible to and managed by Devanha 
(as above). Responsibility to the RSLs should 
be through a service level agreement between 
Devanha and the  RSLs. 
f. Strategic responsibility split. 
Difficult in practice to 
separate “development 
strategy” (RSLs) and 
“strategic decisions about 
execution of the 
programme” (Devanha). 
There should be clear split of responsibility: 
RSLs decide what projects they want to be 
involved in within Devanha (because they have 
risk/local accountability). 
Devanha takes strategic decisions about all 
projects which are in programme. Devanha has 
management responsibility for all projects in the 
programme. 
To fulfil its role, Devanha needs to have a 
dedicated team of development staff with line 
management responsibility through the 
Devanha MD. 
 
g. Roles and responsibilities: Have clear agreement, setting out 
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Devanha‟s agency role 
allows for delivery of a large 
programme but there was 
lack of clarity in the 
respective roles of Devanha 
and the RSLs. 
responsibilities – Devanha should have full 
control after decision to include project has 
been taken. Devanha should have service level 
agreements with each RSL. 
RSL role should be to decide on 
participation/non-participation, selection of 
schemes to include in Devanha programme 
and to receive completed units.  
RSLs could continue to have input to 
development of Devanha specification. 
h. Financial risk: Formation 
Agreement addressed grant 
redistribution where there 
was a surplus but not in the 
event of a shortfall. Lack of 
adequate cost information 
compounded the problem 
because RSLs were 
unaware of how much risk 
they were exposed to until 
late in the programme. 
 
 
Analysis of risk including positive and negative 
scenarios should be undertaken at outset and 
principles for apportioning risk should be 
explicit. 
All RSLs should be aware of risk exposure 
before entering into a collaborative agreement. 
Development staff working directly for Devanha 
will help in apportioning professional 
responsibility. 
The impact of rent harmonisation on HAG 
levels should be explored as a prerequisite for 
further development. 
SHR should be given further opportunity to 
comment on treatment of risk in future 
agreements. 
The quality of cost data should be sufficient to 
monitor risk effectively to alert partners to 
potential shortfalls earlier than was the case 
with Devanha – buy-in of project managers and 
contractors is an important element of this. 
i. Monitoring performance 
and managing risk. Overall 
view that the systems were 
not adequate and 
monitoring involved “fixes” 
rather than the systematic 
monitoring system which 
had been sought. 
 
Establishing a performance monitoring system 
should be a key task for the MD and her/his 
team at the outset of any programme. This 
needs the buy-in of the project managers and 
of the contractors. 
The development of web based technology to 
assist in project monitoring is appropriate for 
any large collaborative programme. However, it 
is essential that the collaborative partners 
including project managers and surveyors are 
involved in the specification and that the 
technology is fitted to the needs of the client. 
Commissioning a live version of any tool should 
be part of the IT project specification. The 
collaborative organisation should appoint a 
named project manager for the IT project, in 
Devanha‟s case this should be the MD. 
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Evaluation of Strategic Relationships: Local Authority Engagement 
13.18 Devanha‟s performance in developing external relationships is strongly 
influenced by its governance structure. However, this issue is considered 
separately because of its importance, particularly in relation to any future 
collaborative development programme. Table 13.8 focuses on transferable 
lessons from Devanha‟s relationships with local authority partners. 
 
Table 13.8 Transferable Lessons: Strategic Relationships with Local 
Authorities 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. Devanha largely delivered its 
programme in three LA areas 
in approximately the 
proportions set out in its Offer 
of Grant. In the early part of 
the programme there was 
discontent over an 
underspend in one area and 
overall a feeling that the 
programme was more focused 
on some areas than others.  
A collaborative approach can deliver a large 
programme over a number of local authority 
areas. However, the relationship and 
information flows with each individual LA 
need to be given attention. LAs need to be 
kept informed of decisions which affect their 
area and the collaborative organisation 
should try to respond to local authority 
concerns. 
b. Devanha‟s external image was 
poor. It was difficult to 
communicate with and local 
authorities viewed Devanha as 
a „badge‟ for RSL activity.  
Appointment of a managing director with a 
dedicated team of development staff working 
for Devanha would overcome this problem. A 
collaborative organisation should have clear 
branding and engage with external partners 
on its own behalf. 
c. Devanha was seen as a 
complicated organisation with 
which to deal. 
Separation of responsibility as discussed in 
relation to governance, so that programme 
and project management were Devanha‟s 
responsibility, would address this issue. 
d. The strategic relationship with 
LAs was poorly developed. 
LAs were not involved in 
determining Devanha‟s 
objectives. 
The local authority is a key strategic partner 
and should be involved in setting objectives.  
e. Communication with LAs over 
the implementation of the 
programme was weak, for 
example, when where there 
were changes impacting on 
The collaborative organisation should be 
proactive in communication with the LAs.  
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numbers or tenure.  
f. Devanha was a useful 
organisation in bringing 
together larger sites or 
developing difficult sites. LAs 
were supportive of Devanha in 
this respect. LAs saw benefits 
in dealing with a collaborative 
organisation with a spread of 
housing management 
infrastructure in place. 
A large programme allows a more strategic 
consideration of sites. Given the increased 
strategic role of LAs there are particular 
advantages in a group of RSLs coming 
together where they collectively have a wide 
spread of housing management resources 
and existing units across a local authority 
area. 
g. LAs are concerned over a lack 
of capacity to build amongst 
organisations in their areas. 
They see a continuing role for 
a collective approach to 
development. 
A collaborative organisation could have more 
collective capacity to build a reasonable 
programme in an area than individual RSLs. 
Due to its existing housing management 
capacity (mentioned in f.) it is in some 
respects at an advantage over a larger non-
local RSL developer. 
h. Devanha was seen to deliver a 
quality housing product. 
Devanha‟s good reputation means there 
could be potential for offering development 
services to LAs provided that it was viewed 
as a viable partner. 
i. In the medium term LAs are 
looking to a variety of 
providers to deliver affordable 
housing. All options including 
LA, RSL and private sector 
developers may have a role. 
However, Devanha members 
are not currently taking 
forward any proposals and 
other models are likely to 
become the norm in the area. 
Having delivered a large programme of good 
quality housing, Devanha should be in a 
position to compete to deliver affordable 
housing in LAs in the north East. It would 
have to demonstrate improvements in 
governance and corporate identity to show 
that it was an easy and efficient partner.  
 
Evaluation of Performance on Quality & Standards 
13.19 Testing out opportunities for bulk procurement and promoting housing quality 
were key elements of the Devanha initiative. Within the constraints of costs, 
Devanha performed well in fostering and sharing good practice in achieving 
housing quality. On the other hand, it was largely unable to achieve benefits 
from bulk procurement. Table 13.9 summarises lessons in relation to quality 
and standards. 
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Table 13.9 Transferable Lessons: Quality and Standards 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. Bulk procurement: 
Devanha was largely 
unable to gain benefits 
from bulk procurement, 
in part because schemes 
had been developed 
using traditional methods 
before being brought into 
Devanha and also 
because RSLs hung onto 
elements of individual 
specification. 
Relatively small 
efficiencies were gained 
in relation to components 
such as windows and, 
more significantly, timber 
kits in later schemes. 
Schemes brought into a collaborative programme 
after being designed traditionally will have limited 
scope for economies from bulk procurement. 
A collaborative programme should strive to have a 
standard specification in place before considering 
schemes for inclusion.  
RSLs should submit schemes to a collaborative 
programme as early as possible and with as little 
pre-design as possible. 
The standard specification should balance local 
variation with standardisation. Member RSLs 
should have input into the continuing development 
of the standard specification so that it can be 
improved with reference to experience and needs 
of RSLs without unnecessary variation. 
b. Environmental 
performance and 
sustainability: The 
programme met targets 
for SAP rating and eco-
homes standards. A 
small number of houses 
in non-framework 
schemes failed to meet 
the SAP target. 
Devanha focused on 
sustainable building and 
output included local 
sourcing, timber frame, 
air source heat pumps 
and super-insulated 
houses. 
Setting energy efficiency targets provided a useful 
focus for the programme. More generally, setting 
key themes for quality improvement can act as a 
driver of quality in a collaborative programme. 
 
Consideration should be given to how standards 
can be extended to non-framework schemes, as 
section 75 projects increase in importance in the 
national affordable housing programme.( In some 
areas, particularly energy and accessibility, 
improved building standards are resulting in more 
convergence between RSL and private developer 
standards, so this will become easier to achieve.) 
 
c. Promoting Higher Quality 
Standards – The 
Performance 
Improvement Group 
explored quality but 
timing was too late to 
influence some schemes. 
Early adoption of standard layouts, specifications, 
and components would enable a number of 
benefits, including economies of scale in 
procurement, and repetition leading to improved 
quality. 
d. Innovation – The Early investigation and adoption of innovative 
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Performance 
Improvement Group 
explored the potential for 
innovation and use of 
modern methods of 
construction, e.g. off site 
construction including 
use of „pods‟. 
approaches may deliver benefit and provide a 
step-change in the way housing is delivered.   
The collaborative organisation should have a 
standard specification in place and update this 
through an equivalent of the Performance 
Improvement Group. The potential for sharing 
knowledge would be increased and risk reduced if 
all RSLs were involved, along with consultants, 
contractors and, where appropriate, suppliers. 
Solutions could be discussed and implemented 
jointly and address performance, sustainability, 
economies of scale and buildability. 
 
Evaluation of Training & Employment 
The Devanha Offer of Grant set targets in relation to training and employment. As 
one of a range of targets, training and employment was given relatively low priority. 
Training targets were knocked off course by the recession in the building industry 
although there were some achievements. Table 13.10 highlights lessons from 
Devanha in relation to training and employment. 
 
Table 13.10 Transferable Lessons: Training and Employment 
 
Devanha Experience Lessons 
a. Devanha set up objectives for 
training & employment with a key 
target of creating 150 modern 
apprenticeships. These targets 
were not achieved but selection 
criteria for framework contractors 
included their attitude to training 
and the contractors did take on 
apprentices during the recession. 
Include a positive approach to training in 
selection criteria for framework 
contractors. Even in the deep recession 
experienced in the industry, committed 
contractors were able to retain 
apprenticeships with the help of a large 
works programme. 
b. Devanha had targets for 
recruitment of people with 
difficulties which made it hard for 
them to find employment. 
Devanha did not retain the 
services of specialist consultants 
beyond the first year and had very 
little success in this area. 
Achieving wider benefits in employment 
and training requires commitment and 
allocation of resources. To be 
successful, dedicated resources have to 
be allocated to provide the necessary 
support to help people into work. 
c. Devanha set up targets for 
recruitment and training which 
could be monitored. These were 
not implemented by the non-
framework contractors. 
It is valuable to monitor recruitment and 
training activity. Given the increasing role 
of section 75 agreements in delivering 
affordable housing, efforts should be 
made to encourage and monitor 
employment and training by private 
developers.  
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d. There was very limited impact on 
subcontractor recruitment and 
training. 
There was no mechanism for engaging 
with subcontractors in employment and 
recruitment and no incentive for them to 
address the issue. Extending best 
practice in training and recruitment may 
be explored as part of extending 
partnering within the supply chain. 
 
 
Summary Conclusion 
13.20 Devanha Phase 2 was designed as a bulk procurement initiative which aimed 
to produce cost and grant efficiencies while delivering high quality 
development. Through the use of a framework agreement and NEC form of 
contract, Devanha would demonstrate a change of style, culture and process. 
13.21 Devanha did not meet its works cost targets as set out in the Offer of Grant. It 
did, however, meet the validated and adjusted cost targets taking into account 
agreed inflation and compensation events.  
13.22 Devanha was hampered by tensions between the roles of the Board and 
individual RSLs. A Devanha-like collaborative organisation could be more 
successful with clear demarcation of responsibility; the collaborative 
organisation would require complete responsibility for strategic programme 
level issues and operational project level issues. 
13.23 Devanha or a successor organisation should create a strong leadership 
position such as a managing director. Development staff should also work 
directly for the collaborative organisation. 
13.24 Devanha and its partners did not fully implement the collaborative approach 
and only partially fulfilled the requirements of the NEC contract; cultural 
change was not fully embedded and some of the advantages of NEC were not 
fully realised. Addressing these issues would be a key role for a managing 
director. 
13.25 Devanha was successful in building to a high quality but did not achieve 
significant bulk procurement savings. Further standardisation of specification, 
sharing of experience amongst partners and application of this early in the 
design process would provide opportunities to improve quality and explore 
bulk procurement efficiencies. 
13.26 Devanha did not fully address issues of risk to individual RSLs. A more 
complete analysis of risk should be a prerequisite for collaboration. It would 
determine whether RSLs should become involved as partners. Risk analysis 
should be a major feature of choice of contract and procurement route. 
13.27 With appropriate changes to its governance and leadership, Devanha could 
form a model for collaborating with local authorities to deliver affordable 
housing programmes in future. 
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